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Economists inflate the explanatory power of measurable variables such as price and 
income to explain demand. Using only quantifiable variables is very attractive since it makes it 
easy to construct mathematically consistent and well expressed models. However, since 
Lancaster (1971), economic awareness has increased to such a degree that latent, hardly 
observable and/or measurable variables may bring more insight to the demand analysis. Two 
approaches compete to introduce such variables: an economic approach originally developed by 
Lancaster and Becker (1965), and a statistical approach. For Lancaster, beyond quantities of 
goods demanded, the characteristics of goods are what shape consumer utility and consequently 
determine its choice. This approach is theoretical and largely based on economic intuition. Few 
empirical studies using Lancaster have been successful so far. The second, purely statistical 
approach, considers the possibility of transforming observed data to obtain the “basic wants” 
that truly affect consumer choice. This approach, known as the Preference Independence 
Transformation (PIT), has so far been applied only in a few studies using the Rotterdam model 
frame. The PIT was certainly deduced through mathematically thorough and consistent analysis 
to uncover the basic want, denoted as T-goods. We intend to revisit the PIT under the Rotterdam 
framework to uncover the basic goods. Alongside, we implement —for the first time—an 
independent transformation that eliminates the Slusky interdependencies from the Almost Ideal 
Demand System (AIDS) setting. We will refer to it as the Slutsky Matrix Independent 
Transformation (SMIT). Regarding our purpose to check if the two techniques identically define 
the basic goods, the findings were not conclusive. As a result, we further the analysis by 
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For a long time, it has been considered convenient and realistic to explain consumer 
demand by considering economic variables such as prices and income, whether the consumer is 
an individual or a set of individuals. This has been the case because such variables are amenable 
to measurement and quantification. There exists, however, strong research that considers the 
characteristics of goods to be strong candidates for explaining consumption behavior(Lancaster, 
K. 1971) and (Becker, G. S. 1965) are two of them. (Brooks, R. B. 1970) and (Theil, H. 1975-76) 
initiated an original technique to move from an existing set of commodities – that are 
complementary or substitutes—into a new set of goods of equal numbers and intended to meet 
the basic wants of the consumer. The underlying assumption is that the latent goods, that is, the 
goods that correspond to basic wants, are unrelated. The literature rather, cautiously refers to 
these latent goods as transformed goods or T-goods.  Leading researchers have explored this 
technique of incorporating characteristics.  
 In this study, we revisit this technique by trying to uncover the basic wants behind the 
demand for gas, distillate fuel oil, and the liquefied petroleum gases (LPG) by US households. 
To give some examples, electricity may be used for many basic wants such as lighting, cooking, 
and cooling. Similarly, without being exhaustive, gas may be used for heating, and cleaning. We 
will first explore the technique under the Rotterdam model framework and then undertake its 
extension to the Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS). 
 The Rotterdam model is a model sufficiently studied to allow the Preference 
Independence Technique to use it as a framework. In a recent paper, (Barnett, W. A. and A. 
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Serletis 2008) address the issues of how to estimate the Rotterdam model for two versions: the 
absolute and the relative price versions.  
On the other hand, economists interested in the topic have not, to the best of our 
knowledge, so far applied any independent transformation technique using a theoretical 
framework other than the one defined by the Rotterdam model. In this work, we implement an 
independent transformation on the Slutsky matrix to one of the most, with the Rotterdam model, 
popular demand systems: The Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS). We will refer to it as the 
Slutsky Matrix Independence Transformation (SMIT). The introduction of the SMIT enables us 
to first check its feasibility and then the sensitivity of the transformed goods to the technique and 
the demand system chosen. 
In the next chapter, we will address the literature review and analyze the two models. 
More importantly, we will dissect the PIT and see how close technique could be associated with 
the AIDS. Chapter 3 covers the estimations with the two models. The last chapter will examine a 




2 The theoretical toolbox 
In this chapter we will first conduct an in-depth presentation of the two systems of 
demand—Rotterdam and AIDS—that are going to serve as platforms for the Preference 
Independence Technique (the Rotterdam case) and the Slutsky Matrix Independence 
Transformation (the AIDS case). We will highlight all theoretical tools that will be needed to 
unfold the transformation techniques. In a second stage we will, after introducing the technique, 
provide the understanding on how to apply it in the two systems of demand.  
2.1. The theoretical framework 
2.1.1. The Rotterdam model 
The Rotterdam model is one of the most popular models for the empirical estimation of 
the consumer demand for goods. It originated with (Theil, H. 1965) and (Barten, A. P. 1966) 
and,  because they were both based in Rotterdam during that period, the model is referred to as 
the Rotterdam model. The model is based on a log linear specification. Economic literature 
provides substantial applications of this model to various markets. Using the Rotterdam 
framework, (Barnett, W. A. 1979), studied the issue of aggregation over consumers. Introducing 
the possibility for consumers to have different tastes, while using a convergence technique, he 
presents a Rotterdam model with constant coefficients. 
We present in the next sections some important theoretical tools necessary to have a 
sufficient knowledge of the derivation as well as the formulation of the Rotterdam model. Next, 
we set the problem of the Preference Independence Technique and the way to apply it under the 
Rotterdam model framework. To be specific, we provide an overview of the Stone model, the 
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differential system formulation through the Barten’s equation, formulate the Rotterdam model 
and proceed to the transformation technique. 
In demand analysis, two categories of models emerge: those constructed outside the 
utility theory—the earliest ones—and those using microeconomic theory. (Stone, R. 1954) is a 
pioneer in utilizing the first type. 
2.1.1.1. Stone’s demand function 
Because of its double logarithmic expression, Stone’s demand function directly captures 
the commodity economic interdependences, without referring to the consumer theory formalism. 
It can be expressed as follows 
 ,
1
ln ln ln 1,...,
n
i i i ij j
j
q M p i n  

     (2.1.1) 
Where iq  is the quantity demanded of good i , i  is the constant for equation i , M is the 
income, jp  is the price of good j , i  is the income elasticity of demand for good i , and ij  is 
the Cournot elasticity of demand for good i  with respect  to price j . Differentiating this 
equation—denoted as the double-log system—allows a straight computation of price and income 
elasticities. 
We can draw some important properties from this model when we multiply the income 
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  (2.1.2)  
For each good, the product of the income elasticity and the budget share equals the 
marginal share. Let us denote the latter as
i









  Equivalently, the income elasticity is the ratio of the marginal share to the budget share 
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This relation states that the total expenditure equals income. That is, 
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   (2.1.4) 
The Engel aggregation is obtained by differentiating both sides of (2.1.4) with respect to
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In terms of budget shares this can be translated as 
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A last way of apprehending the adding-up condition is to divide both sides of (2.1.4) by 









   
‐ The symmetry condition 
 ,  i,j=1,...,ni ij j ji      (2.1.5) 
In some ways, this model is the predecessor of the Rotterdam model. According to 
(Deaton, A. and J. Muellbauer 1980), it suffices to envisage variable income and price 
elasticities, differentiate Stone’s equation, and incorporate the Slutsky decomposition, to get the 
basic equation for the Rotterdam model. From this perspective, the Rotterdam model is just a 
differential of Stone’s equation. However, a huge difference exists between the Rotterdam model 
and the Stone model since the latter is not supported by any utility theory. In addition, doing this 
way neglects many important concepts crucial for a good understanding of the Rotterdam model. 
One advantage of the Rotterdam model over the Stone demand function is, on the one 
hand, its generation from the utility theory and, on the other hand, its thorough logical 
consistency. Before giving the definitive version of the Rotterdam model, it is worth reviewing 
all the steps leading to its definition. Knowledge of these steps is vital for its correct use in 
empirical studies. Barten’s Fundamental Equation is an important system of equations leading to 




2.1.1.2. Barten’s fundamental equation 
The Rotterdam model is understood as a first order approximation of a demand system. 
Its determination begins with the differentiation of the Marshallian demand and budget 
constraint. For this, the Rotterdam model is a further specification of the differential approach. 
This requires having a “well-behaving” utility function, that is, twice differentiable, strictly 
quasi-concave with positive marginal utility for each good, and a second derivative matrix that is 
a negative definite. In addition, no specific form of the utility function is needed. 
Suppose a utility function ( )U U q  where 1 2 1( , , , , )
n
n nq q q q  q   and an 
economic environment defined by the income M , and the price vector
1 2 3( , , ,..., ) nnp p p p  p . 
Subject to the budget constraint, the first order conditions of the utility function 
maximization gives  
 1
( ..., )









   (2.1.6) 
                                 and 






                                                                                  (2.1.7) 
The first step towards the Rotterdam model is to differentiate each of these two equations,  
(2.1.6) and (2.1.7), with respect to the price of each good and the income M . By doing so, we 
seek to assess the impact on the endogenous variables  ,q of changes in the explanatory 
variables  , Mp . 
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We have previously seen that the second element of each of these two systems represents 
two ways of expressing the Engel aggregation. Because of this adding-up property, we will 
always assimilate the total expenditure to the income. 
Note that ij  is the Kronocker product with value 1 when i j , and 0 otherwise. These 
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All these equations can be summarized in one matrix relation known as the Barten’s 
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U , the matrix of second derivatives, is symmetric and negative definite as 
the utility function is quasi-concave.  
We solve this matrix relation by taking the first element of the left-hand side—provided it 
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On the other hand, we also use (2.1.12) and (2.1.13) to reformulate (2.1.15) as 
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Equation (2.1.18) or, equivalently, (2.1.19) decomposes the total effect in total 
substitution effect and income effect. The first two terms, together, measure the total substitution 
effect that can be decomposed, according to Houtthaker, into a specific effect, the first term, and 
a general effect, the second term. The first term is called the specific effect because it is specific 
to each ( , )i j . It shows the specific interdependences between the goods i  and the goods j . The 
second term, the general effect, indicates how all the commodities compete for the last unit of 
dollar. A thorough analysis of the distinction between specific effect and general effect can be 
found in pages 191-193 of (Theil, H. 1967). 
 An important observation for the subsequent developments is that when the marginal 
utility of each good is independent of the quantity demanded of any other good, the second 
derivative of the marginal utility is 0 whenever i  is not equal to j . The matrix of the second 
derivatives becomes diagonal and so does its inverse. In both cases, the Hessian matrix of the 
utility function, by assumption, is a negative definite. 
It is worth keeping in mind that the Rotterdam model is a specific extension of the 
differential approach. 
In the second stage, we will connect this remark to the results found above. Let us 
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 is the marginal share. 
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     (2.1.24) 
If we define: 







  (2.1.25) 
the normalized price coefficients as  











  (2.1.26) 
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    (2.1.28) 
The left-hand side of (2.1.28) indicates the contribution of the thi  good to the Divisia 
volume index. It can be viewed as the “quantity component” of the change of the thj  budget 
share. The first term on the right-hand side is a fraction of the Divisia volume index. Two 
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observations need to be made for i  and ij : All  i  sum to one and, given a row i , the row sum 
of all ij equals i . For this reason, the ij ’s are denoted as the normalized price coefficients.  
From now on, we denote   ,,  as ij n nn n M . Make distinction between M , the total 
expenditure and ,n nM , the matrix of normalized price coefficients. In matrix term, 
, , ,1[ ] [ ]n n ij n n i n  M ι ι  and
'
1, , ,1 1n n n n ι M ι , where ι is the n by 1 matrix of ones. It is also 
important to highlight the difference between the matrix of the normalized price coefficient  
,n nM  with the matrix of price coefficients that we will denote as ,n nV   
    , , ,n n ij ijn n n nv V   




v  . This parameter is supposed 












   
  
.  The sign is explained by the 
negative definiteness of the Hessian matrix U (not to be confused with the utility U  which is not 
in bold). (Theil, H. 1975, vol. 1, p.29) reports (Frisch, R. 1959) conjectures on the income 
flexibility the higher| | , the richer the consumer. Note that high income flexibility in absolute 
value is identical to low income elasticity of the marginal utility of income since one is the 
reciprocal of the other. 
 The fact that the sum of all price coefficients equals one allows us to express the 


















M   (2.1.29) 
From (2.1.26), we see that ij is positive since the matrix   ,ij n nu  is negative definite and 











M   (2.1.30) 
where P  is a diagonal matrix that has the prices along the diagonal. The marginal utlity 
of income, , and M  are positive. 
This means that, the matrix of the normalized price coefficients , ,[ ] ,n n ij n nM is definite 
positive. The estimation of the (2.1.28) system would not directly gives ,n nM  but the matrix
,[ ]ij n n , where ij  is the coefficient of the 
thj relative price.  
 , ,
1
,[ ] [ ]
'







  (2.1.31)  
Observe that if we fix i  and sum ij over the columns, we find i . The matrix ,n nV is a 
symmetric and negative definite matrix. 
In the next developments, we should note that if the marginal utility of each good is 
independent from the change in any quantity consumed of another good ( 0iju   whenever i   is 











 (2.1.32)  
The differential equation simply becomes: 
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On the other hand, the equation (2.1.28) can be re-expressed to show the decomposition 
of the total effect into general effect and specific effect: 
  
1 1 1
ln ln  [ ]
n n n
i i i ij j i i
j j i
w d q d Q dlnp dlnp   
  
      (2.1.34) 
While the first term inside the brackets is the specific effect, the second stands for the 







  measure corresponds to the Frisch index 
(1932). 
At this point, it is appropriate to introduce the Slutsky equation in a more convenient 
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If we denote ij as the ( , )


























  (2.1.37) 
It suffices to consider (2.1.25) and (2.1.26) to express our previous expression as  
  ij ij i jv      (2.1.38) 
  ij ij i jv    . Observe that .ij ijv  In other words,  ij ij i j      
 This allows us to re-express (2.1.34) as: 
  
1
,  , 1,...n ln  ,l
n
i i i ij j
j
w d q d Q dln i j np 

                  (2.1.39) 
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 . We should remember that this relation gives the Slutsky coefficient. Hence, the 









                    (2.1.40) 
The resultant uncompensate elasticity can be expressed as 
 rot rotij ij j iw      (2.1.41) 
Equation (2.1.39), equivalent to equation (2.1.34), is the final step for the differential 
equation. However, they can only be estimated when the differentials are replaced by finite 
approximations. 
In the last step of the formulation, we write the discrete equations. The Rotterdam model 
is in fact a discrete formulation of either (2.1.34) or (2.1.39).  
In the first case, the relative price version  ij ijv  ijv  is the ( , )
thi j  price coefficient. The 
parameters are the i ’s and ijv ’s. 
 In the second case, the absolute version, we need to explicitly keep ij in the equation. 
The parameters are the i ’s and the ij ’s. In both cases, we set, for any variable itx ,
1.ln lnit it itDx x x                                                             
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 Since the approach is discrete, we consider itw   as the arithmetic average of the budget 
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  is the Frisch price index. 





it it i t ij jt
i
tDq D pw Q D  

   (2.1.43) 
Where   and , 1, ,ij ij i j i jv n        
At this level, it is important to introduce the homogeneity condition as it constitutes one 
criterion that characterizes the optimizing behavior of a consumer. It translates the idea that the 
consumer does not react after a simultaneous and proportionate change in income and prices. In 
other words, the consumer is only sensitive to the real income; he is not victim of money 
illusion. For this to happen, the demand functions should be homogenous of degree zero. 
We can then apply the Euler equation to the Marshallian demand equation, 
1( , ,..., ,... )i i j nq q M p p p . 
First, we consider the fact that by homogeneity of the demand functions, we can write 
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 1for 0,  ( , ,..., ,..., )
n
i i j nq q M p p p         (2.1.44) 













    (2.1.45) 
It is then easy to see that when the demand functions are homogenous of degree zero, that 
is 0n  , the relation (2.1.45) can be expressed as 
 
1







    (2.1.46) 
This equation can be reformulated as 
 
1
0 ji ii j
i j i j
pq M q
q
M q p q
  
    
   
This last relation provides the demand homogeneity property in terms of the elasticities: 
 
1







     (2.1.47) 
To get the demand homogeneity in terms of the Hicksian elasticities, we first send the 
second term of (2.1.47) to the right hand-side. By doing so, we obtain the expression of the 
income elasticity in terms of the uncompensated elasticitites. Second we sum over j  the relation 
(2.1.41) to get 
 rot rotij ij ij j        
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Next, we plug the expression of the income elasticity in terms of the price elasticities into 
this last relation. The resulting relation is the homogeneity condition in terms of the Hicksian 
elasticities.  
 0rotijj     (2.1.48) 




 , which implies our final 
expression of the homogeneity condition: 
 0ijj    (2.1.49) 
We can now close the parenthesis of the homogeneity issue and come back to our 
Rotterdam model expression in (2.1.43).  
The Slutsky coefficients satisfy the symmetry conditions and add up to zero—the 
homogeneity condition: 













In the relative price version the adding-up property states that the marginal propensity to 
spend of all goods sum to one and the net effect of a price change on the budget is zero.  i  and 
ijv are the parameters, and the model is nonlinear in the parameters. 
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 In the absolute version, i  and ij are the parameters. The model is linear in the 
parameters. Note that when the preferences are independent, the model simplifies to the 
following system: 
 '( )it it i t i jt tDq DQw Dp DP     (2.1.52) 
2.1.2 Formulation of the Almost Ideal Demand System  
The AIDS, due to (Deaton, A. and J. Muellbauer 1980), specifies a system of demand the 
goal of which is to capture the behavior of the budget shares as dependent on the logarithms of 
the prices of all the commodities involved and the logarithm of the income. This way of 
expressing the demand system found its plausibility on the fact that it is not the quantity 
demanded that is of interest but, rather, the demand behavior. What matters to economists is 
mainly finding parameters that enable the calculation of the price and income elasticities. 
AIDS is derived from a cost function that presents a Cobb Douglas structure 
 1( , ) ( ) ( )U UC U a bp p p   (2.1.53) 
where the utility index  is such that 0 1U U   . The relation 0U   corresponds to a 
subsistence state, and 1U   to a bliss state. p is a column vector of n unit prices. Applying the 
logarithm operator to this equation will give  
 ln ( , ) (1 ) ln ( ) ln ( )C U U a U b  p p p   (2.1.54) 




ln ( ) ln ln ln
2
n n n
k k kj k j
k k j
a a a p p p
  
   p    (2.1.55) 
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The symmetry condition is imposed by the relation  1
2ij ji kj jk
         
ln ( )b p  has the following structure 




b a p  p p   (2.1.56) 
Combining (2.1.53), (2.1.54) and (2.1.55) we get 
 0 0
1 1 1 1
1




k k kj k j k
k k j k
C U a a p p p U p 
   








C U a U p

  p p   (2.1.58) 











, we can use the equivalent formula 
( , )

















i i ij j i k
j k
w p U p   
 
      (2.1.59) 
Deducing the expression of the third term in (2.1.58), we can write the final expression of 
the AIDS system: 
  
1
ln [ln ln ],  where ln ln ( ) and M=C ,
n
i i ij j i
j
w p M P P a U  





















   . 








   
3. The symmetry is imposed by  1
2ij ji kj jk
        
4. The semi-negative definiteness of the Slutsky matrix is usually checked and not 
imposed. This is the case when 
 
1 1










    
2.1.2.1. AIDS elastcities and the Slutsky matrix 
First, we will derive the general formula for the elasticities. Second, we will determine 
the Aids elasticities. Finally, we will determine the AIDS Slutsky matrix. It is important to point 
out that the AIDS slutsky matrix constitutes its Hessian matrix. 
2.1.2.1.1. Elasticity formula 
We need to formulate the price and income elasticities in a more suitable way for 
calculating the AIDS elasticities and the Hessian matrix as well. We will normalize the 















  . 
25 
 








 . This definition is the 
product of two elements: 
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   (2.1.61) 
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   
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Deriving this expression gives i i i
i i
q w w M
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Note that 1 ,  and equivalently i
i i i







  (2.1.62) 
2.1.2.1.2. The AIDS price and income elasticities 
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  (2.1.63) 
The income elasticity 





     (2.1.64) 
Although, the AIDS system does not directly compute the marginal budget share, it can 




i iw    (2.1.65) 
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In other words 
 AIDSi i iw     (2.1.66) 
Its sign is determined by the i  sign, and its absolute value relatively to the budget share. 







  ) guarantees the unity of 
the sum of the marginal shares of all the commodities involved. 
The uncompensated price elasticities 
The procedure is to first calculate the matrix of uncompensated elasticities ( ij ) . Then, 
we will use the Slutsky equation to get the matrix of compensated elasticities( ij ). 





ij ji i k
i








   
         
    
  
   

  











     

   
     
   
   (2.1.67) 









                     
  (2.1.68) 
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Note that the uncompensated elasticity matrix is not symmetric since i j j iw w  .  
The compensated price-elasticity and the Slutsky matrices 
From the uncompensated elasticity matrix, we can easily derive the compensated price 
elasticity matrix. It suffices to use the Slutsky equation. For some given i  and j  , the Slutsky 
equation appears to be 
 ij ij j iw      (2.1.69) 
Using the income elasticity in (2.1.64), we found 
 
1





               
   (2.1.70) 
2.1.2.1.3. The Slutsky matrix 
It is derived from the formula of the compensated elasticities 

















   

             
  (2.1.71) 





2.1.3. Some AIDS-related systems of demand 
2.1.3.1. The LA-AIDS 
2.1.3.1.1. Definition 
The AIDS estimation, formulated above, is non-linearly expressed. It is usual to proceed 
to its linearization by using a proxy of the income deflator, which originally presents a translog 
structure. (Deaton, A. and J. Muellbauer 1980) advise the use of The Stone’s Price index. It is a 
geometric means of the commodity prices weighted by the corresponding budget shares. 
Applying the logarithm operator to the index, this can finally be formulated as 
 ln ,
1




P a w p

  p   (2.1.72) 
(Eales, J. S. and L. J. Unnevehr 1988) propose lagging the budget share in order to avoid 
any simultaneity problem. 
This Linearized AIDS is referred to in the literature as LA-AIDS. The LA-AIDS can  be 
explicitly written as: 
 ,
1 1
ln [ln ln ],  , 1, ,
n n
i i ij j i i t it
j i
w p M w p i j n  
 
         (2.1.73) 
Though its estimation is easier because of its linearity in the parameters, the finding of 
the Hessian matrix can be more demanding. 
2.1.3.1.2. The Hicksian elasticity matrix of the LA-AIDS 
The Marshallian price elasticity matrix 
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We will still use our elasticity formula written above in (2.1.61). 
First we consider 
 
1
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   
       
   
   (2.1.75) 
Evidently, there is a circularity issue in the sense that the elasticity is simultaneously on 
the left and right sides of the equation. It becomes logical that the Slutsky matrix that could result 
from it is not appropriate for applying the Preference Independence Transformation. 
The Differential AIDS (DAIDS) 
We obtain the DAIDS by differentiating the LA/AIDS equation: 









   . From the following two observations, 
‐ the relative change of the income can be decomposed in Divisia price 
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w d p w d q DP DQ
M  
       
‐ and the Stone index can be approximated by the Divisia price index 
 *
1 1 1
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  
       , 





i ij j i
j
dw d p DQ 

    (2.1.77) 
(Barten, A. P. 1993) shows it is possible to give this equation the same structure as the 
Rotterdam model. It suffices to consider the three following relations: 
1. ln ln lni i i i i idw w d p w d q w d M     
2. ln lni i ij j j
j
w d p w d p    
3. lni i j j
j
w DP w w d p    
The DAIDS equation can then be presented as follow 




i i i i ij ij j i j j
j
w d q w DQ w w w d p  

       (2.1.78) 
Recall that we have shown above that the marginal share of the AIDS model is 
i i iw    . Then the expression in parentheses on the second term of the right hand side is 
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comparable to ij  of the Rotterdam model. In addition, we see easily that the income elasticity, 
1 iDAIDSi
iw







  . 
The  DAIDS Slutsky matrix is given by 











  (2.1.79) 
2.2. The Preference Independence Transformation: Genesis, formulation, and 
procedure 
At this point it is relevant to precise three core concepts we will be using all along the 
subsequent developments.  
By commodities, we mean the goods bought in the markets at some prices. Basically, we 
will be dealing with four commodities consumed by the US households: electricity, distillate fuel 
oil, gas, and liquefied petroleum gas. By T-goods, we understand the basic wants supporting the 
acquisition of the goods. 
The third concept is the Preference Independence Transformation process which is a 
linear transformation of a matrix, namely the specific effect, that describes  the commodity 
interdependences at the preference level in such a way its  matrix counterpart becomes diagonal 
under the assumptions that the number of goods equals the number of basic wants, and the basic 
wants are preference independent. 
2.2.1. Genesis 
In the relatively recent history of consumer demand, economists have realized that the 
main factors that determine consumer demands are not as apparent as many think. Behind 
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quantities of goods demanded exists basic wants whose definition may be essential to capturing 
the evolution of demand. In practice, two main paths are open to researchers to incorporate basic 
wants: the first, primarily theoretical, was initially explored by (Barten, A. P. 1993), (Lancaster, 
K. 1971, Lancaster, K. J. 1966), and(Becker, G. S. 1965); the second, purely statistical, is the 
Preference Independence Transformation introduced by Henry (Theil, H. 1967). (Brooks, R. B. 
1970), (Theil, H. 1975, 1977), and (Theil, H. and K. Laitinen 1992) make decisive contributions 
on how to assess consumer basic wants using this technique. 
Economists are stressing more and more the empirically challenging issue of quality on 
demand. In his article,—“Qualities, Prices and Budget Enquiries” (1951-1952)—Theil makes a 
distinction between goods and commodities using the quality criteria. According to this 
approach, a commodity is a group of goods, a good being a quality of the commodity, which is 
perfectly homogenous. In other words, he defined the good as having a perfectly homogenous 
quality. Later, while economists used to assume that consumption of goods produced a 
homogenous utility, (Ironmonger, D. S. 1972) pointed out that wants are various, and multiple. 
He introduced the assumption that, although consumers may be considered as ultimately having 
one want, in practice, they pursue many wants. This raises the interest of disaggregating the 
utility. There is an advantage in microeconomic research to break the synthetic concept of utility 
into many sub-utilities. In his model, he assumed that the consumer has a consumption 
technology (consumption matrix) that transforms units of a commodity into units of ‘personal 
satisfaction’ of the wants. Concurrently, (Lancaster, K. 1971) introduced a slightly similar but 
very innovative approach. According to Lancaster, goods are defined by characteristics, and 
consumers buy goods not for their quantities but for the characteristics they have. For Lancaster, 
all goods possess objective characteristics. The difference between the Lancaster model and the 
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Ironmonger model is that Lancaster model assumes that the characteristics are the same for 
everybody, though people have different reactions to them. Theoretically, this difference can be 
noticed in the consumption matrix. For Ironmonger, each consumer has his own consumption 
technology. Lancaster on the other hand considers a unique consumption technology matrix for 
all consumers. In the Lancaster model each good presents “measurable characteristics in fixed 
proportions with quantities of the characteristics directly proportional to the quantities of the 
goods” (Brooks, R. B. 1970). Under the Lancaster approach, the problem of the consumer can be 
expressed as follows: 
 
U( )                                   
  
. . : ,   and , .
Max
s t Y Y

   
z
z Bq pq q 0
 (2.2.1) 
 Where U( )z  is the utility function, z  is the vector of characteristics, q  is the vector of 
goods, B  is the consumption technology matrix, and Y  is the income. To have a clear idea of 
how B  is constructed, let us consider that each commodity has K  potential characteristics. 
Given   1 21, ,  [   ]k Tk k jk nkk K b b b b   b  is the amount of the thk  characteristic possessed by 
the thj  commodity. From here, we see that 1 2 .[ .. ].KB b b b  
This problem raises a recurring question: How can we use the model in empirical studies 
if the characteristics are not measurable and, even less, observable? 
A close, but different and no less important, model is the one introduced by Becker 
(1965). He considers the household unit as a “factory” where goods purchased on the market are 
combined with the time—by the mean of a household production function—to produce 
“commodities”. These commodities provide the direct arguments in the household’s utility 
function. They are denoted as “basic commodities.” If we denote iZ  the basic commodity i , iT
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the vector of time inputs used to get the thi  basic commodity, and iX  the vector of market goods, 
then the household production function can be expressed as 
 ,( )ii iZ Q X T  (2.2.2) 
This research raises the necessity to find a technical way of uncovering the basic wants. 
Theil (1967; 1975-76; 1977) and Brook (1970) introduced a statistical technique in the analysis: 
the Preference Independence Transformation (PIT). Historically, two techniques were used in 
economics to formulate “a set of variables that are in some way ‘more basic’ than the observed 
variables”: Principal Component Analysis and Factor Analysis. The first technique was 
introduced in economics by (Stone, R. 1947). The second was used by (Gorman, W. M. 1965, 
1959, 1976) to assess the consumer’s basic wants. According to (Theil, H. 1967, 1975, 1977), the 
PIT is between these two techniques. It defines a set of variables that are more essential than the 
observed variables. In practice, observed data on closed goods reveal “substitutability” or 
“complementarity” patterns. The PIT changes “observed consumer goods” into “transformed 
goods,” the latter being characterized by the independence of the marginal utility of each good 
relative to the consumption of all other goods. The transformed goods—denoted in the literature 
as T-goods— are representative of the basic wants. The main assumption made with this 
technique is that the consumer chooses “basic wants” independently. In other words, the 
“transformed goods” are neither complement, nor substitute. For this reason, (Theil, H. and K. 
Laitinen 1992) found it somehow unrealistic to apply the PIT technique on “narrowly defined 
goods.” The “transformed goods” should have an additive structure at the level of the utility 
function. An example of such structure is given by the Klein-Rubin (1948) utility function which 











 q  (2.2.3) 
Where 1i   and the ia ’s are constant. 
2.2.2. Formulation under the Rotterdam model 
The formulation of the PIT technique began with Brook’s dissertation who first noticed 
that a change in real income modifies the proportion of luxuries and necessities in the 
consumer’s basket. Under the Rotterdam model framework, measuring these changes is 
simplified if the cross-partial derivatives of the consumer’s utility function are zero. From this 
observation, he considers Taylor’s expansion of the utility function around the optimal point: 
   1 remainder term
2
U U  ' 'x a x x x  (2.2.4) 
If we suppose that the Hessian matrix is diagonal, then the utility function can explicitly 

















  (2.2.5) 
In the general case, it is not. Brook wanted to find a way to diagonalize the Hessian 
matrix. This problem is not different from Lancaster’s, who focused on uncovering the 
characteristics of goods based on their quantities. In fact, diagonalizing the Hessian matrix is 
equivalent to the construction of a set of “new commodities” referred to as “basic goods” with 
the propriety of being “want or preference independent.”Brooks’ first step is to transform 
linearly the price and quantity vectors by setting: 
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    and z B y Bx p  (2.2.6) 
Where B  is the transformation matrix, z  is the transformed quantity vector, and y  is the 
transformed price vector. 
For the budget constraint to hold in the new prices and quantities, it suffices that ' B B I . 
In that case the budget constraint Yp x' is equivalent to  
 1' 1' .Y  y B B z  (2.2.7) 
Likewise,  
 ' ' ' ' Y  y z p B Bx p x   (2.2.8) 
 As a result, the transformation matrix must be diagonal. 
It becomes then possible to write Taylor’s utility function expansion in terms of the 
transformed goods. 
Let  
    1TU  zz BU  (2.2.9) 
Then  
     ' '1 remainder term
2T
U   z BUB zz Ba z'  (2.2.10) 
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For the basic goods to be independent, the matrix 'BUB  must be diagonal. This means 
that the marginal utility of each basic good is independent of the quantity consumed of any other 
transformed good. 
From the expressions (2.2.6), we can draw the following equations: 









  because of the orthogonality condition. The first equation gives the 
contribution of each good quantity to the transformed good. The second equation shows how 
each price contributes to the transformed good. 
Barnett (1979) pointed out that under the Rotterdam model framework a diagonalization 
of the Hessian matrix U  involves at the same time a diagonalization of , [ ]n n ijM —the 















. This is equivalent to writing  
 ( ) 0,  1, ...,ij i ix i n    w  (2.2.11) 
Where the i ’s are latent roots and the ix ’s are characteristic vectors normalized. From 
now on, we will read Y  as the matrix Y in diagonal form. 
As a result,  
 '










w  (2.2.12) 
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 In matrix form, this can be concisely written as  
 
 
 1 2 3
( )   and  ,( )
      1,..., ;  ...
i i
i n
   
 
M w 0 I




In view of  (2.1.30), Theil (1975) defines (2.2.12) as a  “diagonalization of the inverted 
Hessian in expenditure terms relative  to the expenditure levels”. He noticed a more practical 
way of rewriting it by premultiplying (2.2.13) by the matrix of the square root of the budget 
share in diagonal form, 1/2( )w  , and taking 
1/ 2( )w X out the braces: 
 1/ 2 1/ 2 1/ 2 ' 1/ 2 ' 1/ 2 '[( ) ( ) ]( )  where ( ) [ ( ) ]        w M w I w X 0 X w X w I  (2.2.14) 
From the normalization expression in (2.2.14), we find that: 
 ' 1( ) ( ) w XX   (2.2.15) 
This allows us to write the normalized price coefficient matrix as function of the 
eigenvectors of the diagonlization: 
 ' 1 1, , ,( )n n n n n n
 M X ΛX   (2.2.16) 
Theil (1975), using three axioms showed that the transformation—the  move from the 
knowledge of the parameters of the commodity goods to this of the basic wants—denoted as T-
goods in the literature—is  a passage to equation (2.1.34) to a new equation involving two 
additional matrix operators, denoted R  and S .   
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The full understanding of the transformation requires to write the model in matrix term 
and a thorough explanation of the three operators involved: the transformation matrices 
, , and n n n nR S , and the composition matrix ,n nT . 
2.2.2.1. The Rotterdam model in matrix term 
Let us reconsider the Rotterdam model equation (2.1.42). To write it in a matrix format, 
we consider the following:  
 1 1 2 2 ',  t t t t t nt ntw Dq w Dq w Dqy   1 2  't t t ntDp Dp Dpπ  , and  
 1 2  't t t nt  ε  . 
It is important to note that the second term of the right hand side of the Rotterdam model 
can be expressed as 
 , , , ,
1 1
( ' ) '
n n
ij jt k kt n n t t n n n n t n n t
j k
Dp Dp    
 
 
     
 
  M π π M ιι M π M I ιμ π   
We have used ,' 'n n ι M μ obtained from the relation seen above that , ,1n n nM ι μ . 
The Rotterdam can then be expressed as 
    t t tDQ    y Mι M ιι πM ε't I   (2.2.17) 
2.2.2.2. The transformation matrix R 
By definition, , [ ] ( , 1, , )n n ijr i j n R   is the square matrix for which the components ijr
measures the quantity of dollars on the thi T-good (basic want) when one dollar is spent on the 










   










   
Theil’s first axiom states that the T-goods satisfy the budget constraint. Consequently, 
 
1 1 1 1
Full income=  
n n n






p q r p q
  
    (2.2.18) 
This implies that  
 , 1 2' '  that is r ... 1 for any 1, , .n n j j njr r j n     ι R ι   (2.2.19) 
This constraint, very important for subsequent developments, is the condition under 
which the full income is invariant under the transformation. It suffices to divide on both side of 
the equality in (2.2.18) to get the definition of the  thi  T-good budget share in terms of the 









   (2.2.20) 
In matrix terms this relation can be expressed as ,T n nw R w   
To summarize the three equations (2.2.18), (2.2.19), and (2.2.20) express somehow the 
same fact that the full income is invariant under the transformation. 
2.2.2.3. The transformation matrix S 
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The operatorS  is determined after a decomposition of the T-good budget share change, 
first using the discrete time, second, the continuous time, and finally proceeding by identification 
between the two expressions. 
In general, the decomposition of the budget share in discrete time can be expressed as 
follows 
 jt jt jt jt jt jt tw w Dp w Dq w DM      
The same decomposition when the changes are infinitesimal is: 
 ln ln lnjt jt jt jt jt jt tdw w d p w d q w d M     
Moving these two equations from the commodity space to the T-good space requires 
applying R and summing over j in the first equation. In the second, it requires just to add the 
index T  (which design time in the T-good space). It is important to note that in both equations, 
we deal with the thi  T-good. This explains why we should have the index i , and not j  in the 
second equation. We get the following two equations: 
 
-   
-      ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
ij jt ij jt jt ij jt jt ij jt t
j j j j
it T it T it T it T it T it T it T
r w r w Dp r w Dq r w DM
d w w Dp w Dq w DM
   

   
   
  (2.2.21) 
Recall that jtDp , and jtDq are the commodity price and quantity log-change. By contrast, 
( )jt TDp , and ( )jt TDq are the T-good price and quantity log-change. Insofar as these two 
equations express the same reality, we can approximate the corresponding terms of the two 
equations. 





















  (2.2.22) 
The definition of the price log-change of the thi  T-good corresponds to the second Theil 









   (2.2.23)  
The price log-change of the the thi  T-good (2.2.22) can be simply expressed as 
 ,
1 1
( )           where 1it T ij jt ij
j j
Dp s Dp s
 
     
Likewise, 
1




  The transformation matrix (2.2.23)  can be written in 
matrix terms as 
    1T

 S w R w   (2.2.24) 
The constraint on the ijs  is:  






2.2.2.4. The composition matrix T  
Applying the operator ,n nR  to the Rotterdam dependent variable ty  proceeds to moving 
from the jth component of the Divisia ( jt jtw Dq ) to the Divisia quantity component of the 










   [ ' ]t t tDQ    R RMι RM ιy ι M π Rεt I   (2.2.25) 
This transformation is not yet complete since it contains the vector of price log-changes 
of commodities. We need to move from tπ  to tSπ . This is the reason why the previous equation 
is reformulated as 
  1 1 1( ) ( )[ '( )]t t tDQ      Ry RMS ι RMS ιι RMS Sπ Rεt I                          (2.2.26) 
We obtain this result using the two main properties of the transformation matrices
 and R S , namely, ' '  and  ι R ι Sι ι . We infer then that the independent transformation 
technique is the fact from moving from 1 to RMSM . (Theil, H. 1975, chapter 12) has shown 
that this expression is equivalent to solving the diagonalizaton of the normalized price coefficient 
matrix with respect to the budget share – see relation(2.2.11). 
In fact using the definition of ,n nS  in (2.2.24), we can write that: 
        1 11 1 1[ ]T T
   
    RMS RM w R w RM w R w   (2.2.27) 
Using (2.2.15) , and (2.2.16) the expression can be written as: 
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  1 1 1 ' 1( ') ( ) T    RMS R X ΛX XX R w   (2.2.28) 
If we take the T-good budget shares in diagonal form to the left hand-side, the relation 
implies:  
   11 ' 1 ' 1 ' 1 1 ' 1( ) ( ) [ ]T
     
  RMS w R X ΛX R X R ΛX R   (2.2.29) 
We remark that the left hand side is the product of two matrices in diagonal form. As a 
result, the right hand-side should be diagonal. 
 Hence, the problem is to choose the transformation matrix R in such a way 
1 1 1( ' ) ( ' ) is diagonal under the constraint ' = '  X R Λ X R ιR ι  . and X Λ are the eigenvector and 
eigenvalue matrices. 
(Theil, H. 1975) has proved that the solution of such a problem is 
 1 ,',  where n n R B X ι X B  represents a permutation matrix with exactly one in each row and 
each column. Without loss of generality, we may choose B I . 
According to Theil third axioms, 1RMS  is diagonal with positive elements. This is the 
case because the matrix of normalized price coefficients has positive roots—see (Theil, H. 1975) 
on pages 221 and 236. In addition, from the formulas above two important relations can be 
derived: 
 1 1 1( ) ( ) ( )T
  
    RMS μ X X   (2.2.30) 
 1 2( ) ( ) ( )T     w T X   (2.2.31) 
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The last member of the relation (2.2.30) is obtained from the expression of the 
transformation matrices, the normalized price coefficients, and the budget shares in diagonalized 
form, all expressed in terms of the eigenvector matrix X.  The second member of the same 
relation is directly read from the after transformation Rotterdam model (2.2.26). We in fact 
observe that 1( ) T












  (2.2.32) 
Consequently, the eigenvalues constitutes the transformed good expenditure elasticities. 
2.2.2.5. Important formulas 
In practice, five formulas are of special interest: 
‐ The composition matrix definition ( )T R w   
‐ The transformation of the commodity budget share into the T-good budget share 
via the operator R : ,T n nw R w   
‐ The definition of the Transformation matrix ,n nS  :    1, ,n n T n n

 S w R w   
‐ The property of the T matrix that its row sums yield the T-good budget shares: 
TTι w  
‐ The property of the T matrix that its column sums yield the commodity budget 
shares: ' 'ι T w  
To visualize the two last properties, we may want to observe it on a general structure of a 
T matrix of four commodities and four T-goods. 
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The column outside the matrix is the T-good budget share. It is the row sum of the ,n nT   matrix. 
This comes from our second formula above. Likewise, the row below the matrix is the column 
sum that gives the commodity budget shares. This is possible because of the invariance of the 
income. See (2.2.19). It is easy to see from this matrix that for a given observation period, each 
element of ,n nR  is obtained by the corresponding element in column of ,n nT  divided by the 
column sum. Likewise, each element of ,n nS is obtained by the corresponding element in row of 
,n nT  divided by the row sum.  
2.2.2.6. Sequential procedure to solving the problem  
Step 1: we solve the diagonalization problem (2.2.14) to get the eigenvalues and 
eigenvectors. 
Step 2: We need to remember that our original problem is a diagonalization with respect 
to the budget share. Hence from the solution of step 1 we deduce the solution for the problem 
(2.2.13). That is the reason we consider 
 1/ 2( )i ik w x   (2.2.33) 
as the characteristic vector for (2.2.14). From it, we deduce the characteristic vector of 
our initial problem, the relation(2.2.13).  
 1/ 2( )i ix w k

   (2.2.34) 
1,1 1 1,2 2 1, 1 1 1, 1
2,1 1 2,2 2 2, 1 1 2, 2
1,1 1 1,2 2 1, 1 1 1, 1
,1 1 ,2 2 , 1 1 ,
n n n n T
n n n n T
n n n n n n n n n T
n n n n n n n n nT
r w r w r w r w w
r w r w r w r w w
r w r w r w r w w
r w r w r w r w w
 
 















        1w      2w       1nw    nw  1 
48 
 
Step 3: From the knowledge of ,n nX , we find the transformation matrices , ,and n n n nR S , 
and the transformation matrix ,n nT . We will expressed all these matrices in terms of X . These 
additional formulas can be deduced from the main formulas above. 
‐ 1 ', , ,( )n n n n n n

R B X X   (2.2.35) 
Where ,n nB is any permutation matrix with exactly one in each row and each column, and 
0’s elsewhere. If we specify ,n nB  to be , ,n nI  then (2.2.35) becomes: 
‐ 1 ', ,( )n n n n

R X X       (2.2.36) 
‐ 1 1 1, ,( )n n n n
  
S X X   (2.2.37) 
‐ 1 1, ,( )n n n n
 
T X X   (2.2.38) 
The next relations lead to the determination of the outputs of the diagonalization. The 
relation (2.2.39) defines the T-goods budget share in diagonal form. (2.2.40) is commodity 
income elasticity. (2.2.41) is the T-good marginal share in diagonal form. (2.2.42) is the T-good 
income elasticity in diagonal form. 
‐ 1 2( ) ( )T 

 w X   (2.2.39) 
‐ 1 ,( ) n n

Λ w M ι   (2.2.40) 
‐ 1 1 1, , ,( ) ( ) ( )T n n n n n n 
  
   μ R M S X Λ X ι  (2.2.41) 
‐ 1( ) ( )T T T

 Λ w μ   (2.2.42) 
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A consequence of these results is that  
‐ ', , ,n n n n n nR S I   (2.2.43) 
(2.2.43) can be used for verification of the validity of the econometric results as well the 
constraints on R  and S . 
2.2.3. Formulation under the AIDS model 
In this part, we explore the possibility of implementing the independent transformation 
technique to the Almost Ideal Demand System. We recall that the Rotterdam model does not 
require specifying the utility function, and is in addition determined from welfare maximization 
under the budget constraint. This will not be the case with the AIDS. The AIDS originated from 
the logarithm subclass of price-independent generalized-linear preferences denoted as PIGLOG. 
With PIGLOG preferences, the expenditure function is expressed as ( , ) ( ) ( )e U a Ub p p p  and 
results from an expenditure minimization for some level of utility. ( ) and ( )a bp p  are supposed 
to be positive and linearly homogeneous. We have seen previously that the main AIDS equations 
are deduced by application of the Shepard’s lemma. This is the main difference with the 
Rotterdam model. As a result, we apply an independent transformation on the Slutsky matrix. 
For this reason, we refer to the technique as the Slutsky Matrix Independent Transformation. As 
it was done with the Rotterdam model, it is conceivable to proceed to its diagonalization. 
2.2.3.1. Transformation of the AIDS in matrix form 
It is important to point out here that we keep all the notations and definitions we used 
while applying the transformation to the Rotterdam model. In the following developments we 





ln [ln ln ],  where ln ln ( ) , 1, ,
n
i i ij j i
j
w p M P P a i n  





ln ( ) ln ln ln
2
n n n
k k kj k j
k k j
a a a p p p
  
   p   
In matrix notation, it can be expressed as 
 ',1 , ,1 ,1 0 1, ,
1
( ( ' )
2t n n n t n t n n t t n n t t
m a      Z α Β Π Θ Θ α Π Π Β Π ε   (2.2.44) 
Where variable matrices are 
  1 2 1 ',t t t n t ntw w w wZ    
  1 2 1ln ln ln ln ',t t t n t ntp p p pΠ   
  1 2 1and '.t t t n t nt   ε    
We express the logarithm of the total expenditure as: 
 ln ,t tm M   
The parameter matrices are: 
  ,1 1 2 1 ',n t t n t nt   α    
  ,1 1 2 1 'n t t n t nt   Θ    
 , [ ]n n ij  . 
0a  is the constant.   
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As we have seen it in the previous sub-section, the transformation consists of applying 
the matrix ,n nR  to the system of demand and rewriting it in such a way that we will have in the 
equation only variables in the T-good space. For example, we would like to have in the equation 
,  instead of .n n t tS Π Π   
First, we apply the matrix ,n nR  to (2.2.44) to get: 
 
, , ,1 , , , ,1 , ,1 0
'
, ,1 1, , ,1 , ,
1
              ' )
2
n n t n n n n n n n t n n n t n n n
n n n n t n n n t n n t n n t
m a   
  
R Z R α R Β Π R Θ R Θ
R Θ α Π R Θ Π Β Π R ε
  (2.2.45) 
Next, we apply ,n nS  on tΠ , using the fact that we does not change the equation when we 
introduce 1, ,n n n n
S S  : 
 
1
, , ,1 , , , , , ,1
' 1
, ,1 0 , ,1 1, , ,
' ' 1 1
, ,1 , , , , , ,
( )
              ( )
1
              ' ( ) ( )
2
n n t n n n n n n n n n n n t n n n t
n n n n n n n n n n n t









R Z R α R Β S S Π R Θ
R Θ R Θ α S S Π
R Θ Π S S Β S S Π R ε
  (2.2.46) 
Since The two transformation matrices are linked by the relation (2.2.43), we use 
1
, ,n n n n
 S R  on the fifth term of the right-hand side, and ' 1, ,( )n n n n S R  on the sixth term of the 
right-hand side. This yields the final expression of the transformed AIDS: 
 
1
, , ,1 , , , , , ,1
' '
, ,1 0 , ,1 1, , ,
' 1
, ,1 , , , , , ,
( )
              ( )
1
              ' ( )
2
n n t n n n n n n n n n n n t n n n t
n n n n n n n n n n n t








R Z R α R Β S S Π R Θ
R Θ R Θ α R S Π




Reformulating the fifth and sixth term of the right hand-side of the equation give the final 
expression of the AIDS after an independent transformation: 
 
1
, , ,1 , , , , , ,1
'
, ,1 0 , ,1 , ,1 ,
' 1
, ,1 , , , , , ,
( ) ( )( ) ( )
              ( ) ( )( ) ( )
1
              ( )( ) ( )( )
2
n n t n n n n n n n n n n n t n n n t
n n n n n n n n n n n t








R Z R α R Β S S Π R Θ
R Θ R Θ R α S Π
R Θ S Π R Β S S Π R ε
  (2.2.47) 
Comparing the before-transformation AIDS in matrix form (2.2.44)to the after-transformation 
AIDS in matrix notation (2.2.47) allows us to draw the following remarks. 
1. Applying the transformation matrix ,n nR  to the budget share column matrix of the 
commodities directly yields the basic want budget share column matrix: ,T n n tw R Z  
2. The SMIT is essentially the move from: 
 1to ,B RBS   
 to ,S SΠ   
 to ,Θ RΘ   
 ,1 , ,1 to n n n nα R α   
It should be noted that because of the transformation, 1RBS is diagonal. 
It is also easy to see in view of the AIDS income elasticity that the T-good expenditure 
elasticitiy matrix for each period t can be expressed as: 











R Z R Θ
Η
R Z







3 Applications of the PIT and SMIT technique 
The Preference Independence Transformation is the transformation that only applies on the 
specific substitution effect. Indeed, we will associate it with the Rotterdam model. Concerning 
the SMIT, the transformation is implemented at the level of the expenditure function Hessian 
matrix.  
3.1 Data description 
According to the Energy Information Administration (EIA), the types of energy used in 
the home are natural gas (45%), electricity (41%), heating oil (8%), and propane (5%). We have 
obtained the following residential sector data to conduct our analysis: 
1. The Electricity Retail Sales to the Residential Sector in million kilowatt-hours and the 
Average Retail Price of Electricity in Nominal Cents per kilowatt-hour (Taxes included). 
After cleaning and harmonizing all the data, the quantity for electricity is expressed in 
million kilowatt hours, the price in dollars per kilowatt hours. 
2. The Natural Gas Consumed by the Residential Sector in Billion Cubic Feet and the 
Natural Gas Price, Delivered to Residential Consumers expressed in Nominal Dollars per 
Thousand Cubic Feet. For reason of consistency, the quantity is expressed in million 
cubic feet, and the price in dollars per cubic feet. 
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3. The raw Distillate Fuel Oil Consumed by the Residential Sector expressed in Thousand 
Barrels (42 gallons) per Day is the number 2. Distillate Price to Residences, U.S. 
Average, expressed in Nominal Cents per Gallon Excluding Taxes. Some technical 
explanations need to be made. Heating oil is refined from oil; it is what Americans use to  
heat their homes. Note that at refineries, crude oil is separated into different fuels such as 
gasoline, kerosene, lubricating oil, heating oil, and diesel. Heating oil and the diesel fuel 
are denoted as distillates. The difference between the two is that the heating oil contains 
more sulfur. It should, however, be stated that the number 2 fuel oil is the main heating 
oil in US residences. The quantity and price of the final data we use on Distillate Fuel Oil 
are respectively in million gallon and dollar per gallon. 
4. The Liquefied Petroleum Gases (LPG) are mixtures of propane, ethane, normal butane, 
and isobutane. However, American homes basically use propane. We express the quantity 
of LPG in Million gallons and the price in dollar per gallon. 
All data start on January 1995 and end on August 2010, which corresponds to 187 
observations. 
3.2 The Preference Independence Transformation under the Rotterdam model 
We have previously seen that the Rotterdam model is a discrete formulation of the 
differential system. As such, two estimation procedures are available: the absolute version 
estimation, linear in the parameters, and the relative version estimation which involves a 
nonlinear estimation. The application of the Preference Independence Transformation under the 
Rotterdam model requires a nonlinear estimation as it gives the possibility to extract the 
normalized price coefficient ijv , which gives the specific nature—in the Houthakker’s sense—of  
the relation between the commodities involved. We recall that when ijv is positive the 
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commodities  and i j  are specific complements, and vice versa. Brooks, Theil, Barnett, and 
followers have used it are the core of the transformation. This does not mean that we should omit 
the absolute version. In practice, the Absolute version estimation enables us to control the 
validity of the relative version estimation. It is also very useful, when we will proceed to the 
conditional demand estimation that will be necessary for the relative version estimation. 
In the following developments, we will respectively proceed to the absolute version 
estimation, the relative version estimation, and the diagonalization of the normalized price 
coefficient matrix.  
3.2.1. The absolute version estimation  




,                 1,..4it it i t ij j itt
i
Dq DQ Dpw i  

     (3.1.1) 
Where the parameters are the marginal budget share, i , and the ( , )thi j  (Slutsky, E. 
1915) coefficient. The latter can be explicitly written as with , 1,..., 4ij ij i jv i j     . Four 
restrictions are of paramount importance: 








   
‐ The homogeneity condition:  
‐ This is an attribute of a rational consumer that is not veiled by the nominal 
change of income. It precisely means that he is insensitive to any simultaneous 
and proportionate change in income and prices. In other words, consumption is 
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‐ The Slutsky symmetry condition:  
In essence, this is an economic translation of the mathematic Young’s theorem that 
stipulates that when a valued function of n   variables is twice continuously differentiable on its 
domain, then, on the interior of its domain, the x n n  matrix of second-order partial derivatives is 
symmetric. This is the case when 
 ,                     , 1,..., 4ij ji i j     
In practice, real data always show discrete patterns; their changes are not infinitesimal. 
Hence, it is always an approximation to suppose that demands for goods are symmetric in their 
interactions. Still, for the sake of the theory elegance, this condition is widely accepted as one of 
the regularity condition of utility theory. 
‐ The negative semi-definiteness of the Slutsky matrix of rank 3.  
Our study takes into account four goods: electricity, distillate fuel oil, gas, and liquefied 





11 21 22 23
21 22
31 32 33
0,      0,      0,      
  
 
   
 
  
     
3.2.1.1. Redundancy issue and last equation parameter derivation 
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3.2.1.1.1. Redundancy issue 









   











w Dq DQ Dp  
  
 
   
 
   . 
By invoking the Divisia formula, the adding-up restriction, and the homogeneity condition, the 








     
In conclusion, the disturbances are linearly dependent and the resulting variance-covariance 
matrix is singular. This is a reason why we said previously that the Slutsky matrix is of rank 3, i.e. n-1. 
One equation has to be dropped, no matter which one.   
3.2.1.1.2. Parameter derivation of the last equation 
By simplification, let us suppose we deleted the last equation as recommended above. It 
could be any equation. After the estimation we need to recover its parmeters and corresponding 











w Dq DQ Dp  
  
 
   
 
     
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  . Plugging these expressions into the 




4 4 4 4
1
t t j jt t
j
w DQ DP  

     (3.1.2) 
3.2.1.1.3. Derivation of the standard deviations 
From now on, we suppose that equation 3 is the dropped one. This assumption is taken 
for the sake of consistency with the next developments. We will provide the reason on 
subsections 3.2.1.2. 
The following eight equations enter into the last equation parameter derivation: 
 3 1 2 41          (3.1.3) 
 13 11 12 14         (3.1.4) 
 23 21 22 24         (3.1.5) 
 33 13 23 43
11 12 14 21 22 24 14 24 44      ( ) ( ) ( )
   
        
   
        
  (3.1.6) 
 34 14 24 44         (3.1.7) 
 31 11 21 41         (3.1.8) 
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 32 12 22 42         (3.1.9) 
 43 41 42 44         (3.1.10) 
We can write this system in matrix form as 
 8,1 8,12 12,1A L C   (3.1.11) 
  where  
  8,1 3 13 23 33 34 31 32 431 '        A ,  
  12,1 1 11 12 14 2 21 22 24 4 41 42 44 '           C , and 
 8,1
1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
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   
L   
It is noteworthy that 8,12L  is the matrix that enables the passage from the matrix of the 
estimates to the parameter matrix of the dropped equation. Since the relation (3.1.11) is linear, 
we can derive the variance by considering 
 '8,1 8,12 12,8( ) ( )Var VarA L C L   (3.1.12) 




3.2.1.2. Econometric estimation and results 
In the above developments, we pointed out the importance of dropping one equation to 
circumvent the singularity effect of the variance-covariance matrix. We first conducted 
preliminaries estimation using the seemingly unrelated regression and dropping the third 
equation. Obviously, it could be easier to drop the last equation. However, our first estimations 
have yielded a Slutsky coefficient matrix in which one of the diagonal entries (coefficient of 
LPG) is positive. A closer examination shows that the coefficient is not significant at 5 %. 
Consequently, it could be considered as 0, which is consistent with the negative definiteness of 
the Hessian matrix which requires that all the diagonal elements be less or equal to 0 (
0 for all [1,4]ii i   ). However we found embarrassing for the PIT unfolding that the entry 
44  vanishes. After reconsidering the data, we found that lagging the prices of DFO (commodity 
2) and LPG (good 4) by three periods solves the problem when all the regularity conditions 
(adding-up, symmetry, homogeneity) are incorporated. In that case, all the diagonal elements 
become negative. This is comprehensible if we remember the fact that the two goods (DFO, 
LPG) are not consumed all the year. Households use them basically for heating, which only 
occurs during the span October to March. Hence, it seems plausible that their current 
consumptions depend on lagged prices by three months. This explains why we have chosen not 
to drop one of the goods for which the prices are lagged. Instead, we have chosen to lag the third 
commodity (gas).Thereby we end up having 184 observations instead of 187. 
3.2.1.2.1. Estimation technique 
With the third equation dropped, the absolute version can be finally expressed as: 
 33 ( ) ,     1,2,4.it it i t ij jt t itjw Dq DQ Dp Dp i         (3.1.13) 
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From the initial absolute version equation, we have dropped the third equation and used 
the expression 3 1 2 4 3( )i i i i ijj          to get this ready-to-use equation. 
Zellner’s Seemingly Unrelated Technique (SUR) is appropriate for estimating this 
system. It is a joint estimation of several regressions. It is presumed that the contemporaneous 
errors associated with the dependent variables are correlated. SUR on a set of regressions 
presenting the same explanatory variables on the right hand side give identical results of 
individual OLS estimations of the models. However we would still gain from the SUR if we 
have to perform some joint tests. 
Let  1 1 2 2 184 184 ',i i i i i iw Dq w Dq w Dqy    1 2 4 'i i i i i   β ,  
         1 2 184 'i i i i  ε  , and  
 
1 1,1 1, 1
, ,
,1 , 1
,  where 3 .
n
T n t j jt
T T T n
DQ Dpx Dpx












The absolute version model can be reformulated as: 
                                            where 1,2,4i i i i  y Xβ ε   (3.1.14) 





       
               
              
y X 0 0 β ε
y 0 X 0 β ε
y 0 0 X β ε
  (3.1.15) 
This last equation can be succinctly written as 
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 1( )n  y I X β ε   (3.1.16) 
1nI  is the identity matrix of order n-1.   is the Kronecker product. 
The following assumptions apply to the disturbances: 
( ) 0itE     
0 if 
( )








Let us consider the contemporaneous variance-covariance matrix 1, 1 [ ],  i,j 3n n ij   Ω
. Not eliminating the third equation—in our case—or anyone of the four equations—in 
the general case—would make ,n nΩ  singular. 
Hence, we have  
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We can show that the SUR will give the following results: 
 1ˆ ( ' ) '   β I X X X y   (3.1.17) 
 1ˆ( ) ( ' )Var    β Ω X X   (3.1.18) 
3.2.1.2.2. Results 
Two preliminary estimations have been conducted. First (see Appendix A), we estimate 
the absolute version without any restrictions. It turns out that the constants were not significant. 
At this level, only marginal shares are of interest. The marginal share is higher for gas (47%). In 
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second position, we have the marginal share electricity (45%). DFO, and gas are expected 
presents the same marginal share. Consequently, without any restriction on the estimation, gas is 
more sensitive to the total expenditure. 45% of the increase of the total expenditure is due to gas 
consumption. Dropping the constants (see appendix B) slightly improve the estimation. 
Table 1: Absolute version with all regularity conditions (adding-up, symmetry, 
homogeneity) 
 
Equation  Observation  Parameter  RMSE  2R    2χ    p‐value 
Equation 1  184  4 .0487502 0.8003 811.51  0.0000
Equation 2  184  4 .0062405 0.5932 129.26  0.0000
Equation 4  184  4 .0055228 0.7638 591.28  0.0000
 
  Coefficients  Std. error t‐student p‐value Confidence intervals
Equation 1   
DQt  .4271871  .0201586 21.19 0.000 .3876769  .4666973
Elec.  ‐.857377  .0485713 ‐17.65 0.000 ‐.9525751  ‐.7621789
Dfo  .0214555  .0093793 2.29 0.022 .0030724  .0398387
Lpg  .1049314  .005809 18.06 0.000 .0935459  .1163168
Equation 2   
DQt  .0421955  .0039182 10.77 0.000 .034516  .0498749
Elec.  .0214555  .0093793 2.29 0.022 .0030724  .0398387
Dfo  ‐.0120974  .0079147 ‐1.53 0.126 ‐.0276099  .0034151
Lpg  ‐.0062495  .0036314 ‐1.72 0.085 ‐.0133669  .0008678
Equation 4   
DQt  .0394701  .0023984 16.46 0.000 .0347693  .0441708
Elec.  .1049314  .005809 18.06 0.000 .0935459  .1163168
Dfo  ‐.0062495  .0036314 ‐1.72 0.085 ‐.0133669  .0008678




The results contained in the above table excludes the third equation parmaters. The two 
subsequent tables gives respectively the matrix L --see equation (3.1.12)—that allows to uncover 
the missing estimates related to the third equation. 
.  
Table 2: The matrix 8,12L  enabling the moves from Table 1 estimates to last equation 
parameter estimates 
  1    11    12    14    2    21    22    24    4    41    42    44   
3    1  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  1  0  0  0 
13    0  ‐1  ‐1  ‐1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
23    0  0  0  0  0  ‐1  ‐1  ‐1  0  0  0  0 
33    0  1  1  1  0  1  1  1  0  1  1  1 
34    0  0  0  ‐1  0  0  0  ‐1  0  0  0  ‐1 
31    0  ‐1  0  0  0  ‐1  0  0  0  ‐1  0  0 
32    0  0  ‐1  0  0  0  ‐1  0  0  0  ‐1  0 
43    0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  ‐1  ‐1  ‐1 
 
Table 3: The asymptotically estimated variance-covariance of the last equation 
  3   13   23   33   34   31   32   43  
3    .00030613 
13     ‐8.841e‐06 .00184058 
23    .0000129  .00002653  .00014105
33     ‐3.563e‐06 ‐.00168514 ‐.0001528  .00167652
34     ‐4.915e‐07 ‐.00018197 ‐.00001478 .00016142 .00003533
31     ‐8.841e‐06 .00184058  .00002653 ‐.00168514 ‐.00018197 .00184058
32     .0000129  .00002653  .00014105 ‐.0001528  ‐.00001478 .00002653 .00014105 
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43     ‐4.915e‐07 ‐.00018197 ‐.00001478 .00016142 .00003533 ‐.00018197 ‐.00001478 .00003533
 
Finally the complete estimates of marginal shares and Slutsky coefficients are displayed 
in the subsequent table. Among all the four goods Gas is the most sensitive to its price. Table 5 
shows that an increase of the gas price by 1% decreases Gas consumption by 2.6%. 
 
 




.4271871 -.857377 .0214555 .7309901 .1049314 
(.02016) (.04857) (.00938) (.04290) (.00581) 
     
.0421955 .0214555 -.0120974 -.0031086 -.0062495 
(.00392) (.00938) (.00791) (.01188) (.00363) 
     
.4911473 .7309901 -.0031086 -.6351641 -.0927174 
(.01750) (.04290) (.01188) (.04095) (.00594) 
     
.0394701 .1049314 -.0062495 -.0927174 -.0059645 
(.00240) (.00581) (.00363) (.00594) (.00343) 
After getting all the estimates, It is insightful to check the overall income and price 
elasticities and their evolutions over the time as well to get a complete picture of the issue. 
Expenditure and price elasticitites 
Table 5 displays the overall expenditure and price elasticities. At this level we should 
insist on the use of expenditure instead of income. It is somehow unreasonable to mistake the 
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expenditure elasticity for the income elasticity. For example, gas expenditure elasticity over the 
period is 2 %.  We may be tempted to infer that gas is a luxury. It is however hard to believe that 
any of these four goods could acceptably be viewed as a luxury. To clarify the paradox, we need 
to remember that the Rotterdam model—this will be the case also for the AIDS model—does not 
consider the income in its construction but rather the total expenditure. The US household energy 
total expenditure is in fact a portion of the US household income. From this perspective our four 
goods could be viewed as a block of commodities detachable from the set all goods purchased by 
the US households. 
Suppose that R  is the income of a US household and M  the portion of that income 
allocated to the residential energy consumption as a block of commodities (electricity, 
dfo,gas,and lpg). Let 
iq R
  the income elasticity for good with respect to ii q ; and iq M  the total 
expenditure for good  with respect to ii q . We show: 
      









q R q M R M
R q M R M q
M R q M





             
         
    
  (3.1.19) 
We identify the first element of the last equality member as the elasticity of energy total 
expenditure with respect to the income. It gives the percentage of increase in the total 
expenditure whenever the income increases by 1%. In the US, this percentage may range, 
depending on the income interval in which belongs the household. According to American 
Coalition for Clean Electricity (ACCE), in 2012, US families with gross annual income below $ 
50,000 were expected to spend 8% of their after-tax income of 22,390 on residential energy. 
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These families represent 50% of the US households. The average US household who has an 
estimated after-tax income of $53,229 spend 4% of their after tax income on residential energy.   
Finally, having a gas expenditure elasticity of 2% does not mean at all that gas is a luxury 
good. All that can be inferred is that gas consumption is the most sensitive to the expenditure 
change. Indeed when total expenditure increases, US households tend to first restrict the Gas 
consumption. We note also that DFO, LPG, and gas are complement. Electricity and gas appear 
as substitute. Over the time the elasticities are not very flexible. 
 




ELE DFO GAS LPG 
ELEC .64079947 -1.2861033 .03218419 1.0965173 .15740172 
DFO .86350242 .43907232 -.24756512 -.0636154 -.1278918 
GAS 2.0189012 3.0047947 -.01277815 -2.6108941 -.38112247 




Table 6 : Dynamics of the compensated price and income elasticities 
OBS. 
Commodities  Income eslaticities  Cross and direct price elasticities 
  ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG 
1  Ele  0.74331628  ‐1.4918575  0.03733311  1.2719411  0.18258327 
1  Dfo  0.87059921  0.44268089  ‐0.24959977  ‐0.06413823  ‐0.12894289 
1  Gas  1.3618764  2.0269239  ‐0.00861967  ‐1.761213  ‐0.25709118 
1  Lpg  2.4381794  6.4819085  ‐0.38604924  ‐5.7274152  ‐0.36844398 
 
2  Ele  0.72458275  ‐1.4542588  0.03639222  1.2398849  0.17798169 
2  Dfo  0.83426493  0.42420569  ‐0.23918277  ‐0.06146143  ‐0.12356149 
2  Gas  1.4300387  2.1283719  ‐0.00905109  ‐1.8493621  ‐0.26995866 
2  Lpg  2.4054417  6.3948751  ‐0.38086571  ‐5.6505126  ‐0.36349684 
 
3  Ele  0.68357668  ‐1.3719584  0.03433268  1.1697165  0.16790923 
3  Dfo  0.83174176  0.42292271  ‐0.23845938  ‐0.06127555  ‐0.12318778 
3  Gas  1.6062157  2.3905818  ‐0.01016616  ‐2.0771988  ‐0.30321687 
3  Lpg  2.1266162  5.6536168  ‐0.33671788  ‐4.9955366  ‐0.32136231 
 
4  Ele  0.62373511  ‐1.2518546  0.03132714  1.0673173  0.15321015 
4  Dfo  0.85557338  0.43504058  ‐0.24529188  ‐0.06303126  ‐0.12671744 
4  Gas  2.0038268  2.9823589  ‐0.01268274  ‐2.5913994  ‐0.37827676 
4  Lpg  1.9075506  5.0712301  ‐0.30203211  ‐4.4809396  ‐0.28825835 
 
5  Ele  0.55662891  ‐1.1171705  0.02795672  0.95248715  0.13672663 
5  Dfo  0.95133369  0.48373263  ‐0.27274625  ‐0.07008605  ‐0.14090033 
5  Gas  2.9076897  4.3276067  ‐0.01840353  ‐3.7602978  ‐0.54890544 
5  Lpg  2.0473415  5.4428645  ‐0.3241659  ‐4.8093158  ‐0.30938275 
 
6  Ele  0.51202666  ‐1.0276525  0.02571657  0.87616508  0.12577083 
6  Dfo  1.1604564  0.59006701  ‐0.33270148  ‐0.08549241  ‐0.17187312 
6  Gas  4.3247357  6.4366413  ‐0.02737239  ‐5.5928575  ‐0.81641139 







  ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG 
91  Ele  0.49820438  ‐0.99991075  0.02502235  0.85251279  0.12237561 
91  Dfo  1.340946  0.68184206  ‐0.38444763  ‐0.09878932  ‐0.19860511 
91  Gas  5.3927456  8.0261943  ‐0.0341321  ‐6.9740349  ‐1.0180273 
91  Lpg  1.9731149  5.245533  ‐0.31241324  ‐4.6349537  ‐0.29816605 
 
92  Ele  0.50489301  ‐1.013335  0.02535828  0.86395818  0.12401856 
92  Dfo  1.1777134  0.59884182  ‐0.33764904  ‐0.08676375  ‐0.17442903 
92  Gas  5.0453877  7.5092105  ‐0.03193358  ‐6.5248229  ‐0.95245404 
92  Lpg  1.9038645  5.0614304  ‐0.30144846  ‐4.4722806  ‐0.28770131 
 
93  Ele  0.5484372  ‐1.1007295  0.02754529  0.93846973  0.13471447 
93  Dfo  0.91268505  0.46408063  ‐0.26166573  ‐0.06723875  ‐0.13517615 
93  Gas  3.2585075  4.84974  ‐0.02062395  ‐4.2139842  ‐0.61513183 
93  Lpg  1.6362034  4.3498524  ‐0.25906833  ‐3.8435302  ‐0.24725387 
 
94  Ele  0.64166193  ‐1.2878343  0.03222751  1.0979932  0.15761357 
94  Dfo  0.80383517  0.40873282  ‐0.23045859  ‐0.05921963  ‐0.11905459 
94  Gas  1.916427  2.8522791  ‐0.01212957  ‐2.4783719  ‐0.36177768 
94  Lpg  1.5494626  4.1192518  ‐0.24533423  ‐3.6397715  ‐0.2341461 
 
95  Ele  0.74052941  ‐1.4862642  0.03719314  1.2671723  0.18189872 
95  Dfo  0.77957438  0.39639673  ‐0.22350305  ‐0.05743231  ‐0.11546137 
95  Gas  1.4161226  2.1076601  ‐0.00896301  ‐1.8313655  ‐0.26733162 
95  Lpg  1.7794471  4.7306665  ‐0.28174884  ‐4.1800176  ‐0.26890006 
 
96  Ele  0.80263687  ‐1.6109157  0.04031249  1.3734488  0.19715439 
96  Dfo  0.73221011  0.37231302  ‐0.20992377  ‐0.05394292  ‐0.10844633 
96  Gas  1.2610026  1.8767901  ‐0.00798122  ‐1.6307604  ‐0.2380485 








  ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG 
182  Ele  0.73220667  ‐1.4695602  0.03677513  1.2529307  0.17985438 
182  Dfo  0.99648959  0.50669342  ‐0.28569239  ‐0.07341275  ‐0.14758829 
182  Gas  1.4444757  2.1498589  ‐0.00914247  ‐1.8680324  ‐0.27268403 
182  Lpg  1.1536271  3.0669217  ‐0.1826596  ‐2.7099325  ‐0.17432965 
 
183  Ele  0.66659979  ‐1.3378853  0.03348002  1.1406661  0.16373914 
183  Dfo  1.1749154  0.59741909  ‐0.33684685  ‐0.08655762  ‐0.17401462 
183  Gas  1.7344816  2.581484  ‐0.01097799  ‐2.2430755  ‐0.32743055 
183  Lpg  0.9849111  2.6183896  ‐0.15594594  ‐2.3136095  ‐0.14883424 
 
184  Ele  0.6001841  ‐1.204587  0.03014429  1.0270175  0.14742523 
184  Dfo  1.1547472  0.58716398  ‐0.33106465  ‐0.0850718  ‐0.17102754 
184  Gas  2.3410714  3.4842908  ‐0.01481725  ‐3.0275327  ‐0.44194084 
184  Lpg  0.94193904  2.5041483  ‐0.14914196  ‐2.2126658  ‐0.14234054 
 
185  Ele  0.54197701  ‐1.0877637  0.02722083  0.92741525  0.13312763 
185  Dfo  1.1624136  0.59106219  ‐0.3332626  ‐0.08563659  ‐0.17216299 
185  Gas  3.5385892  5.2665945  ‐0.02239666  ‐4.5761929  ‐0.66800487 
185  Lpg  1.0754474  2.8590807  ‐0.17028101  ‐2.5262841  ‐0.16251557 
 
186  Ele  0.50454706  ‐1.0126407  0.02534091  0.8633662  0.12393359 
186  Dfo  1.4627226  0.74376286  ‐0.41936085  ‐0.10776077  ‐0.21664123 
186  Gas  5.207839  7.7509919  ‐0.03296178  ‐6.734909  ‐0.98312113 
186  Lpg  1.3082955  3.4781082  ‐0.20714903  ‐3.0732569  ‐0.19770228 
 
187  Ele  0.49211523  ‐0.98768966  0.02471652  0.84209323  0.12087991 
187  Dfo  1.9152667  0.97387171  ‐0.54910469  ‐0.14110031  ‐0.28366672 
187  Gas  6.0465285  8.9992401  ‐0.03827006  ‐7.8195235  ‐1.1414466 




3.2.2. The relative version estimation 
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  (3.1.20) 
The Slutsky equation, aboved determined,  ij ij i jv    , links the previous model and 
the relative version. Note that the Slutsky coefficients are replaced with their expressions in 
terms of the price coefficients, the income flexibility, and the marginal shares. This makes the 
new model nonlinear in the parameters. As an estimation technique, we will need to use the 
feasible generalized nonlinear least square which is a nonlinear version of Zellner’s Seemingly 
Unrelated regression model. The literature denotes it as nonlinear SUR (NLSUR). NLSUR 
becomes relevant when the conditional means of the dependent variables given the in dependent 
variables are nonlinear. It can be expressed as  
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In practice, the relative version estimation is the appropriate model for applying the 
Preference Independence Transformation technique as it enables to directly obtain the price 
coefficient matrix. Under the assumption that basic wants should have positive basic wants, 
some identification problem may be raised. Barnett (981) suggests to circumventing the issue by 
introducing the assumption of block independence. Depending on the number of goods in the 
models, at least one good should be assumed block-independent from the others. Obviously, 
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some test is required to check which good is more likely to be block-independent from the 
others. 
As in the absolute version, it is necessary to drop one equation to avoid the singularity 
issue. Theil (1975) has shown how we can delete one equation by reformulating the relative 
version in a more convenient way. 
In the next sections, before conducting the estimation, strictly speaking, we will follow 
Theil by showing how to reformulate the relative version by deleting the last equation. We will 
also define some concepts that are related to the block independence notion. The estimation will 
be conducted gradually. We will first estimate a full version of the model without imposing the 
regularity conditions. Next we will proceed to the estimation of the full version with all the 
regularity conditions. Finally, under the block independence assumption, we will estimate the 
conditional demand before deriving the normalized price coefficient matrix. The last part of this 
chapter will present the diagonalization process. 
3.2.2.1. On dropping the last equation 
Dropping the last equation ( 4i  ) or any other equation from the previous formulation 
(3.1.20) of the relative version is not enough. This is the case because we still need to drop the 
parameter 4  inside the second term of the right hand side. 
Theil observed that, since the row sums of the normalized price coefficients yields the 
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3.2.2.2. Preference independence, block-independence, blockwise dependence 
Preference independence 
Preference independence occurs when all the two-by-two commodities are independent. 









v i j n
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 The preference system can then be represented by a utility function expressed as the sum 
of n  sub-utility functions corresponding to the n  goods. Such a utility function presents a 
diagonal Hessian matrix. Its Slutsky coefficients are  
 
2  for 













We observe that because of the negativity of the income flexibility ( ), the off-diagonals 
are positive. 
Block independence 
Whereas the preference independence assumption sets the independence on the 
commodities, the block independence puts the additivity-assumption on the groups of goods. 
Suppose that we have G  groups of goods (G n ) that are mutually exclusive and exhaustive 
blocks: 1,.., GS S .  The utility is henceforth the sum of G group sub-utilities, 
 
1






 q q .  
In this formula, 1, 2,( , ..., , ..., )g Gq q q q q  and gq  is the column vector of quantities 
available to gS . In that case, the marginal utility of a good is a function of the consumption of 
only the goods belonging to the same groups, not those belonging to other groups. As a 
consequence, the Hessian matrix of such a utility function becomes block-diagonal. This means 
that 
2 2
for , ', ', 0 and for , , 0
i j i j
U U
i g j g g g i j g
q q q q
 
     




 (Barnett, W. A. 1981, p.53) strongly recommended using this approach to avoid 
“identification problems.” It consists of setting, from the matrix of price coefficients,
0 whenever  and   are in different blocksijv i j . In practice, when the number of goods is very 
limited (four goods in our case), it is enough to find one good that is block-independent from the 
others. Obviously, some tests are indicated to uncover which commodity qualifies to be block-
independent from the others. 
Blockwise dependence 
This assumption is often denoted in the literature as the weak separability hypothesis. It 
supposes the existence of an increasing function by which the utility is a function of some sub-
utility functions under the assumption that there exist G groups of commodities as defined above. 
We have Blockwise dependence if  
 1 1( ) ( ( ),..., ( ))G GU U u uq q q   
Blockwise dependence is a weaker version of block independence. Consequently, 
(Barnett, W. A. 1981) rightly pointed out that a rejection of weak separability induces a rejection 
of block independence. It has to be noted that acceptance of weak separability does not 
necessarily mean acceptance of the block independence assumption.  
3.2.2.3. Unconditional, composite and conditional demand equations 
Under the block independence assumption, three types of equations can be considered: 
the within group demand equation (unconditional demand equation), the between group demand 
equation (composite demand equation), and the conditional demand equation. To correctly apply 
the relative version estimation, it is important to find one good that is separable, in the block 
76 
 
independence sense, from the rest of the goods. Upon finding a good for which the test of block 
independence is conclusive, the estimation of the conditional demand equation on the rest of the 
goods guarantees the elimination of any identification issue. 
It is instructive to specify the three types of equation, and to see how a test may work 
before displaying the results for the full version estimation. 
The unconditional demand equation 
It is the individual equation which describes what is happening inside the groups. As 
such, it can be referred to as the within group demand equation. 
  ' ,   it it i t ij jt it g
jeSg
w Dq DQ v Dp DP i S        (3.1.22) 
These equations describe only the demand for goods in the same group. As (Selvanathan, 
S. and E. A. Selvanathan 2005) observed it, the equations only take into account the prices of the 
same group. 
The demand for the groups 
The demand for groups can be obtained by adding over gi S  the unconditional demand 
equation. This requires defining the group budget and marginal shares as well as the conditional 






    (3.1.23) 
 g ii Sg      (3.1.24) 
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    (3.1.25) 
 '  ,         ii g
g
i S     (3.1.26) 
These new concepts verify the adding-up property: 
 ' '1 and 1
g g
G G
g g i i
g g i S i S
W w 
 
          
We define in addition: 
1. The group divisia index ' lngt i iti gDQ w d q    
2. The group price index ' lngt it iti gDP w d p    
3. The Frisch price index '
g
F
gt i iti S
DP Dp

    
We can show that the weighted average of the group price and volume Divisia indices 
verify the volume and price indices of the set of n goods. 
 and  
G G
t gt gt gt gtgt g
DQ W DQ DP W DP     










   
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Using the above formula and adding over all the unconditional equations inside the same 
group, we define the group demand equation as   
 ( ')Fgt gt g t g gtW DQ DQ DP DP       (3.1.27) 
We observe that the parentheses on the second term contain the difference between two 
Frisch indices. The first is the group Frisch price index and the second is the overall Frisch price 
index. The right-hand side expresses the idea that the demand for a group of goods as a whole is 
explained by the real income and the relative price of the group (the group Frisch price index 
deflated by the overall Frisch price index). 
The conditional demand equations 
As their names suggest, these individual equations are conditional to the group demand. 
They specify the group expenditure allocation among commodities within the group. 
We can obtain the conditional demand equation in three steps: 






DQ DQ DP DP  

  (3.1.28) 
Step 2: we plug this expression into the unconditional demand equation (3.1.22) to obtain 
 ' ' '( ) ( )
g
F
it it gt gt i gt ij jtj S
w Dq W DQ DP DP v DP DP 

       (3.1.29) 
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Step 3: we remark that if the block independence is true, then for any row of the price 






 .  
This finally allows us to write the final expression of the conditional demand equation 
 ' ( ),  
g
F
it it i gt gt ij jt gt gj S
w Dq W DQ v DP DP i S

      (3.1.30) 
As mentioned before, estimating this equation requires eliminating one equation. 
The explicit expression of the conditional demand equation 
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  (3.1.31) 
As seen before, the fact of eliminating the equation k  does not eliminate all the 'i .we 
need to reformulate it in such a way that all the parameters belonging to equation k  are 
eliminated. 
Let us denote the second term of the right hand-side A. Then, 
 ,( ) ( )g
F F
j Sii it gt ij jt gt
j i
A v DP DP v DP DP

      (3.1.32) 
We now consider the fact that
' , where  is the income flexibility obtained from the block S  estimation.
g
ij g i g gj S
v   

  We 
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can rewrite the expression as  ' ,gj Sii g i ij
j i
v v  
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Now we use the expression of the Frisch price index '
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Note that ' '1k jj k     . Then, 
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3.2.2.4. The relative version estimation 
Table 7: The Full version estimation without symmetry 
Equation Observation Parameters RMSE 2R Constants 
w1tdq1t 184 6 .0492983 0.7958* (none) 
w2tdq2t 184 6 .0074195 0.4250* (none) 
w4tdq4t 184 6 .0081426 0.4866* (none) 
 
 Coefficients Std. errors t-student p-value 95 %Confidence intervals 
mu1 .5163949 .0190412 27.12 0.000 .4790748 .5537149 
Phi -2.50476 .1743041 -14.37 0.000 -2.84639 -2.16313 
mu2 .0190418 .0022529 8.45 0.000 .0146262 .0234574 
mu4 .020909 .002286 9.15 0.000 .0164285 .0253895 
v12 -.4339414 .0668528 -6.49 0.000 -.5649704 -.3029124 
v14 .083956 .0764421 1.10 0.272 -.0658677 .2337798 
v21 -.0749307 .0172387 -4.35 0.000 -.1087179 -.0411435 
v24 -.000289 .0135831 -0.02 0.983 -.0269114 .0263334 
v41 -.0873149 .018545 -4.71 0.000 -.1236625 -.0509672 
v42 .0430541 .0123956 3.47 0.001 .0187593 .067349 
 
In the absence of the regularity conditions, the marginal share is higher than the one 
obtained under the same conditions when we used the absolute version method. It was 45% in 
the absolute version, here it is 51%. We can remark that 13 14 24, , and v v v are the only coefficients 
that are not significant. However, we have, as expected, a negative income flexibility. Without 
the symmetry condition, the third equation, and the diagonal elements we have ten parameters 
(six 'ijv s , three 'i s , and  ). Imposing the symmetry conditions would bring the number of 




Table 8: The Full version estimation with symmetry constraints imposed 
Equation Observation Parameters RMSE 2R Constants 
w1tdq1t 184 6 .0501013 0.7890* (none) 
w2tdq2t 184 6 .0075786 0.4001* (none) 
w4tdq4t 184 6 .0083203 0.4639* (none) 
 
Parameters Coefficients Std. errors t-student p-value 95 %Confidence intervals 
mu1  .4810664 .0180915 26.59 0.000 .4456077 .5165252 
Phi -2.721291 .1787509 -15.22 0.000 -3.071636 -2.370946 
mu2 .0197855 .0026731 7.40 0.000 .0145463 .0250248 
mu4 .0213345 .0022672 9.41 0.000 .0168909 .025778 
v12 -.1039904 .0190024 -5.47 0.000 -.1412345 -.0667464 
v14 -.0846439 .0192149 -4.41 0.000 -.1223044 -.0469835 
v24 .0201714 .0099983 2.02 0.044 .0005752 .0397676 
 
Table 8 brings back the electricity marginal share to a lower level (48%). It was (42 %) in 
the absolute version. The DFO and LPG marginal shares are also lower than before. However, as 
before, they are in the same range. The income flexibility in absolute value went up. It is now -
2.7%. 
Derivation of the standard deviations of the dropped equation 
(Barnett, W. A. 1981, p. 54-55) concisely presents the general procedure to derive the 




Let   be the vector of parameters to be deduced and   the vector of parameters within 
the estimated model. Obviously, ˆˆ  and    are the resulting estimators. In our case, we will see in 
the next paragraph that    
3 11 13 22 23 44 43 33( ) 'v v v v v v vβ  and 
 1 2 4 12 14 24( ) 'v v v   γ   
We can observe that   contains all the parameters in table 8 (relative version estimation 
with symmetry) and β  contains the remaining parameters not in table 8. The model has in fact 
15 parameters. 10 parameters define the coefficient price matrix. They would have been 16 in the 
absence of the symmetry restriction. The remaining parameters are the four marginal shares and 
the income flexibility. 
It is permissible to write ( )β γ  since the parameters not in the relative version 
estimation table can be deduced by  . In fact, the missing parameters can be deduced using the 
following system of equations: 
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  (3.1.34) 
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 as the derivative of β  with respect to γ  and V  the 
covariance matrix of the limiting distribution of ˆ( ).T    One can show that  
 ˆ( ) ( , ( ) ( ) ')T N β β 0 D γ VD γ . (3.1.35) 
Consequently, a consistent estimator of the limiting variance-covariance matrix is 
 
1 1ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) ' ( ) ( ) '
T T
    
D γ VD γ D γ V D γ   
In Stata, the estimate,
1 ˆ
T
V , of the asymptotic variance-covariance matrix of γ̂  is denoted 
as ( )e V . If we denote the variance-covariance of the deduced parameters as 8,8H , then  
 8,8 ( ) ( ) ( ) 'eH D γ V D γ  . 
The matrix ( )D γ  is given by the subsequent table  
Table 9:  Derivatives of eliminated parameters  
  1       2    4   12v    14v    24v   
3    ‐1  0  ‐1  ‐1  0  0  0 
11v    12    21    0  0  0  0  0 
13v   1(1 2 )     21 1     0  0  ‐1  ‐1  0 
22v    0  22    22    0  0  0  0 
23v    0      2    0  ‐1  ‐1  0 
44v    0  24    0  42    0  0  0 
43v    0  23 4( )      0  42    0  ‐1  ‐1 
33v    1(1 2 )     2 2 21 2 1 2 4          2(1 2 )    42    2  2  2 




Table 10: Values of the derivatives of the eliminated parameters 
 1    2  4  12v  14v  24v
3  -1 0 -1 -1 0 0 0 
11v  -2.6182433 .23142488 0 0 0 0 0 
13v  -.10304767 .24964152 0 0 -1 -1 0 
22v  0 .00039147 -.10768421 0 0 0 0 
23v  0 -2.721291 .0197855 0 -1 -1 0 
44v  0 .00045516 0 -.11611477 0 0 0 
43v  0 -1.2990312 0 .11611477 0 -1 -1 
33v  -5.3395343 .69355241 -2.8289752 -.11611477 2 2 2 
 
Table 11: The estimated variance-covariance of the missing parameters 
 3  11v  13v  22v  23v  44v  43v  33v  
3  .00031032 
11v  .0007822 .00410267 
13v  -1.323e-07 .00180231 .00249164
22v  3.468e-07 -2.144e-06 -2.344e-06 7.579e-08
23v  .00035765 -.02120435 -.01784581 5.953e-06 .24389948
44v  -4.923e-07 -2.876e-06 -1.184e-06 2.270e-08 -5.928e-06 6.417e-08
43v  .0001888 -.01003115 -.0087025 3.119e-06 .11599694 -4.148e-06 .05538576 
33v  .00157812 .01028679 .00391035 1.075e-07 -.06882259 -1.014e-06 -.03244668 
.0301082
4 
Finally, displays the complete marginal share and price coefficient estimates. Under the 
Rotterdam model, the V matrix has to be normalized. Indeed, the assumption that the basic wants 
should have nonnegative income elasticities requires the roots of the candidate-matrix for 
diagonalization to be positive. Note that we make some nuance on the assumption. In fact, it is 
improbable to have a basic want with negative income elasticity. Such a basic want would not be 
one. On the other hand, it is not impossible to have a basic want with null income elasticity. It is 
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the case whenever we reach the needed consumption amount on that basic want. In that case, 
whenever the income increases, the household increases the other basic want consumption. 





ELE DFO GAS LPG 
ELE .4810664 -1.48715144 -.1039904 .3666640817 -.0846439 
 (.01809) (.06405) (.01900) (.06405) (.01921) 
      
DFO .0197855 -.1039904 -.013162692 .0431395898 .0201714 
 (.00267) (.01900) (.00028) (.49386) (.01000) 
      
GAS .4778136 .3666640817 .0431395898 -1.72369176 .0136182424 
 (.017616) (.06405) (.49386) (.17352) (.23534) 
      
LPG .0213345 -.0846439 .0201714 .0136182424 -.0072031252 
 (.00227) (.01921) (.01000) (.23534) (.00025) 
 
The test of block independence 
All it takes to solve the identification issues is to find one good that is strongly separable 
from the others. Since we have four goods, we have four possibilities, provided the block 
independence assumption is true, to have two blocks of one and three goods, respectively. The 
previous results on the full version estimation provide an income flexibility 2.721291full  . 
This indicator is important as it represents the sum of all the price coefficients. Suppose that 
good [1, 4]k   is the strongly separable good. Removing temporarily this good and estimating 
the block of three goods would give a new income flexibility specific to that block. Let us call it
k . Under the validity that good k  is strongly separable, our new estimation relative to the 
former one would verify  
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 full kkk v     
Where kkv  is the diagonal entry corresponding to good k . 
Consequently to check which good is strongly separable, we will test the null hypothesis  
 1H :  versus H :  o full kk full kkk kv v         
After estimating the conditional demand equations, we found that only good four does 
not reject the null hypothesis. We cannot reject the coefficient -2.714088 to be equal to full  with 
2
1    3.11   and a p-value of 0.0780. Hence, if we impose the strong separability on good four, 
the two following price coefficient matrices should provide identical income flexibility. 
 
'
11 12 13 14 1 11 12 13 1
'
12 22 23 24 2 12 22 23 2
'
13 23 33 34 3 13 23 33 3
14 24 34 44 4 44
0
0
 ;   
0
0 0 0
v v v v v v v
v v v v v v v
v v v v v v v





   
   
   
   
   
   
  
We observe that in the first matrix corresponding to the full version estimation with 
symmetry, the marginal share sum equals one. In the second we use the conditional demand 
estimation. As such, the sum of the conditional marginal shares ( ' not i i   ) of the first three 
goods equals one. 
Results of the conditional demand estimation 
The conditional demand estimation concerns the first three goods: electricity, DFO and  
gas. As we did before, one of the equations has to be dropped. As shown Table 13, we drop the 
third equation.  
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Table 13: Estimates of the conditional demand 
Equation Observation Parameters RMSE 2R Constants 
w1tdq1t 184 4 .0483831 0.8033* (none) 
w2tdq2t 184 4 .0086054 0.2265* (none) 
 
 Coefficients Std. errors t-student p-value 95 %Confidence intervals 
mup1 .5314166 .0196842 27.00 0.000 .4928362 .569997 
Phi -3.058302 .1953032 -15.66 0.000 -3.441089 -2.675515 
mup2 .0109806 .0018258 6.01 0.000 .007402 .0145591 
v12 -.0196034 .0108008 -1.82 0.070 -.0407725 .0015657 
 
The next step is to derive the matrix of price coefficients From Table 13 and Table 8 
under the block independence assumption on the first three goods. Then, we normalize the price 
coefficient matrix. To do that, we divide each price coefficient by the sum of all the price 
coefficients. As we have seen before, the sum of all price coefficients equals one. The matrix 
below displays the results. We can easily check that the sum of all coefficients equals one. In 
addition, the matrix presents positive eigenvalues, which attests that the normalized price 
coefficient matrix is positive definite. This is the desirable effect in order to have basic want 
income elasticities that are positive.   
Matrix to be diagonalized 
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3.2.2.5. Composition matrices, Transformation matrices R and S under Rotterdam model 
By definition, the composition matrix is a square table whose column sums yield the 
commodity budget shares and the row sums the T-goods. The table below shows that for the 
second T-good all commodities positively contribute into its budget shares. Logically, the second 
T-good is the T-good with the highest budget share (89%). The product that contributes the most 
on this T-good is the electricity. This excludes heating form being the second T-good. We 
suspect it to be cooling, since it has the second largest income elasticity.  
The first T-good is the most difficult to interpret. The reason is that electricity and DFO 
negatively contribute to it. It has however the highest contribution of gas and the highest income 
elasticity. We may legitimately view it as heating. The fact that electricity and DFO contribute 
negatively to it may be due to the overwhelming gas contribution.  
We may think that T-good 1 is a luxury for being the only basic want with the highest 
income elasticity. It ranges from 2% to up to 7%. (it is 2.16% in the first month, 3.81% in the 
fifth month and 1.77% in the last month of our observations running from February 1995 to 
August 2010). In fact, none of the T-goods should be qualified as luxury. As we have seen in 
(3.1.19), applying the elasticity of energy total expenditure with respect to income to its elasticity 










ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG  T1  T2  T3  T4 
1  ‐0.0726  ‐0.0068  0.1648  0.0000  0.0854  1.87 
1  0.6565  0.0442  0.1950  0.0000  0.8958  0.00  0.89 
1  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0162  0.0162  0.00  0.00  0.16 
1  ‐0.0092  0.0110  0.0008  0.0000  0.0027  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.04 




ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG  T1  T2  T3  T4 
2  ‐0.0700  ‐0.0067  0.1698  0.0000  0.0932  1.95 
2  0.6693  0.0453  0.1728  0.0000  0.8875  0.00  0.88 
2  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0164  0.0164  0.00  0.00  0.16 
2  ‐0.0098  0.0119  0.0008  0.0000  0.0030  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.04 




ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG  T1  T2  T3  T4 
3  ‐0.0623  ‐0.0061  0.1713  0.0000  0.1029  2.16 
3  0.6952  0.0477  0.1339  0.0000  0.8768  0.00  0.84 
3  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0186  0.0186  0.00  0.00  0.14 
3  ‐0.0080  0.0092  0.0006  0.0000  0.0018  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.04 




ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG  T1  T2  T3  T4 
4  ‐0.0480  ‐0.0050  0.1553  0.0000  0.1023  2.66 
4  0.7359  0.0513  0.0896  0.0000  0.8768  0.00  0.79 
4  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0207  0.0207  0.00  0.00  0.13 
4  ‐0.0029  0.0030  0.0001  0.0000  0.0002  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.04 




ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG  T1  T2  T3  T4 
5  ‐0.0311  ‐0.0034  0.1169  0.0000  0.0825  3.81 
5  0.7881  0.0561  0.0523  0.0000  0.8965  0.00  0.72 
5  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0193  0.0193  0.00  0.00  0.14 
5  0.0105  ‐0.0084  ‐0.0003  0.0000  0.0017  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.04 




ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG  T1  T2  T3  T4 
6  ‐0.0200  ‐0.0022  0.0818  0.0000  0.0596  5.63 
6  0.8187  0.0598  0.0323  0.0000  0.9108  0.00  0.68 
6  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0158  0.0158  0.00  0.00  0.17 
6  0.0356  ‐0.0212  ‐0.0006  0.0000  0.0138  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.05 





ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG  ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG  ROW SUMS 
1  ‐0.1263  ‐0.1404  0.4569  0.0000  ‐0.8498  ‐0.0797  1.9295  0  1 
1  1.1423  0.9124  0.5408  0.0000  0.7329  0.0494  0.2177  0  1 
1  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  1.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  1  1 
1  ‐0.0161  0.2280  0.0023  0.0000  ‐3.4569  4.1400  0.3169  0  1 
COLUMN SUMS  1  1  1  1 
R‐MATRICES  S‐MATRICES 
ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG  ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG 
2  ‐0.1187  ‐0.1319  0.4944  0.0000  ‐0.7514  ‐0.0716  1.8230  0  1 
2  1.1353  0.8962  0.5031  0.0000  0.7542  0.0511  0.1947  0  1 
2  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  1.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  1  1 
2  ‐0.0166  0.2357  0.0024  0.0000  ‐3.2877  4.0080  0.2797  0  1 
COLUMN SUMS  1  1  1  1 
R‐MATRICES  S‐MATRICES 
ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG  ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG 
3  ‐0.0996  ‐0.1211  0.5601  0.0000  ‐0.6052  ‐0.0597  1.6649  0  1 
3  1.1124  0.9399  0.4380  0.0000  0.7929  0.0544  0.1528  0  1 
3  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  1.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  1  1 
3  ‐0.0128  0.1812  0.0019  0.0000  ‐4.5169  5.1970  0.3199  0  1 
COLUMN SUMS  1  1  1  1 
R‐MATRICES  S‐MATRICES 
ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG  ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG 
4  ‐0.0702  ‐0.1009  0.6337  0.0000  ‐0.4696  ‐0.0486  1.5183  0  1 
4  1.0744  1.0408  0.3657  0.0000  0.8392  0.0585  0.1022  0  1 
4  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  1.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  1  1 
4  ‐0.0043  0.0601  0.0006  0.0000  ‐15.315  15.5368  0.7786  0  1 
COLUMN SUMS  1  1  1  1 
R‐MATRICES  S‐MATRICES 
ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG  ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG 
5  ‐0.0405  ‐0.0763  0.6923  0.0000  ‐0.3769  ‐0.0411  1.4180  0  1 
5  1.0269  1.2659  0.3096  0.0000  0.8790  0.0626  0.0583  0  1 
5  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  1.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  1  1 
5  0.0136  ‐0.1895  ‐0.0019  0.0000  6.0228  ‐4.8412  ‐0.1816  0  1 
COLUMN SUMS  1  1  1  1 
R‐MATRICES  S‐MATRICES 
ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG  ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG 
6  ‐0.0240  ‐0.0618  0.7207  0.0000  ‐0.3355  ‐0.0377  1.3732  0  1 
6  0.9813  1.6437  0.2849  0.0000  0.8989  0.0656  0.0355  0  1 
6  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  1.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  1  1 
6  0.0427  ‐0.5820  ‐0.0055  0.0000  2.5744  ‐1.5290  ‐0.0454  0  1 








ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG  T1  T2  T3  T4 
91  ‐0.0158  ‐0.0018  0.0665  0.0000  0.0489  7.01 
91  0.8176  0.0607  0.0254  0.0000  0.9036  0.00  0.68 
91  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0200  0.0200  0.00  0.00  0.13 
91  0.0556  ‐0.0274  ‐0.0007  0.0000  0.0275  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.06 




ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG  T1  T2  T3  T4 
92  ‐0.0169  ‐0.0019  0.0708  0.0000  0.0520  6.56 
92  0.8238  0.0603  0.0271  0.0000  0.9112  0.00  0.68 
92  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0207  0.0207  0.00  0.00  0.13 
92  0.0393  ‐0.0226  ‐0.0006  0.0000  0.0161  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.05 




ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG  T1  T2  T3  T4 
93  ‐0.0273  ‐0.0030  0.1059  0.0000  0.0756  4.26 
93  0.7971  0.0568  0.0451  0.0000  0.8990  0.00  0.71 
93  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0241  0.0241  0.00  0.00  0.11 
93  0.0091  ‐0.0075  ‐0.0002  0.0000  0.0013  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.04 




ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG  T1  T2  T3  T4 
94  ‐0.0507  ‐0.0052  0.1592  0.0000  0.1033  2.55 
94  0.7233  0.0501  0.0967  0.0000  0.8701  0.00  0.80 
94  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0255  0.0255  0.00  0.00  0.10 
94  ‐0.0068  0.0076  0.0004  0.0000  0.0012  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.04 




ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG  T1  T2  T3  T4 
95  ‐0.0705  ‐0.0067  0.1673  0.0000  0.0902  1.94 
95  0.6596  0.0444  0.1784  0.0000  0.8824  0.00  0.89 
95  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0222  0.0222  0.00  0.00  0.12 
95  ‐0.0122  0.0164  0.0011  0.0000  0.0052  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.04 




ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG  T1  T2  T3  T4 
96  ‐0.0734  ‐0.0066  0.1444  0.0000  0.0644  1.77 
96  0.6207  0.0407  0.2434  0.0000  0.9049  0.00  0.93 
96  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0207  0.0207  0.00  0.00  0.13 
96  ‐0.0151  0.0235  0.0017  0.0000  0.0100  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.03 






ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG  ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG  ROW SUMS 
91  ‐0.0184  ‐0.0569  0.7297  0.0000  ‐0.3228  ‐0.0366  1.3594  0  1 
91  0.9535  1.9280  0.2784  0.0000  0.9048  0.0671  0.0281  0  1 
91  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  1.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  1  1 
91  0.0649  ‐0.8711  ‐0.0081  0.0000  2.0237  ‐0.9970  ‐0.0267  0  1 
COLUMN SUMS  1  1  1  1 
R‐MATRICES  S‐MATRICES 
ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG  ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG 
92  ‐0.0200  ‐0.0535  0.7277  0.0000  ‐0.3257  ‐0.0368  1.3626  0  1 
92  0.9736  1.6841  0.2783  0.0000  0.9041  0.0662  0.0297  0  1 
92  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  1.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  1  1 
92  0.0464  ‐0.6307  ‐0.0060  0.0000  2.4418  ‐1.4057  ‐0.0361  0  1 
COLUMN SUMS  1  1  1  1 
R‐MATRICES  S‐MATRICES 
ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG  ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG 
93  ‐0.0351  ‐0.0650  0.7027  0.0000  ‐0.3616  ‐0.0398  1.4014  0  1 
93  1.0234  1.2281  0.2989  0.0000  0.8867  0.0632  0.0501  0  1 
93  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  1.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  1  1 
93  0.0117  ‐0.1631  ‐0.0016  0.0000  6.8222  ‐5.6409  ‐0.1813  0  1 
COLUMN SUMS  1  1  1  1 
R‐MATRICES  S‐MATRICES 
ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG  ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG 
94  ‐0.0762  ‐0.0991  0.6213  0.0000  ‐0.4910  ‐0.0503  1.5414  0  1 
94  1.0864  0.9549  0.3773  0.0000  0.8313  0.0576  0.1111  0  1 
94  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  1.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  1  1 
94  ‐0.0102  0.1442  0.0015  0.0000  ‐5.8440  6.5209  0.3232  0  1 
COLUMN SUMS  1  1  1  1 
R‐MATRICES  S‐MATRICES 
ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG  ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG 
95  ‐0.1222  ‐0.1232  0.4825  0.0000  ‐0.7817  ‐0.0740  1.8556  0  1 
95  1.1434  0.8203  0.5144  0.0000  0.7475  0.0503  0.2022  0  1 
95  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  1.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  1  1 
95  ‐0.0212  0.3029  0.0031  0.0000  ‐2.3426  3.1353  0.2074  0  1 
COLUMN SUMS  1  1  1  1 
R‐MATRICES  S‐MATRICES 
ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG  ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG 
96  ‐0.1379  ‐0.1149  0.3708  0.0000  ‐1.1390  ‐0.1028  2.2418  0  1 
96  1.1663  0.7070  0.6250  0.0000  0.6860  0.0450  0.2690  0  1 
96  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  1.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  1  1 
96  ‐0.0284  0.4079  0.0042  0.0000  ‐1.5098  2.3447  0.1651  0  1 








ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG  T1  T2  T3  T4 
182  ‐0.0691  ‐0.0066  0.1660  0.0000  0.0902  1.97 
182  0.6566  0.0448  0.1737  0.0000  0.8751  0.00  0.89 
182  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0342  0.0342  0.00  0.00  0.08 
182  ‐0.0040  0.0041  0.0003  0.0000  0.0004  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.05 




ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG  T1  T2  T3  T4 
183  ‐0.0572  ‐0.0058  0.1642  0.0000  0.1012  2.33 
183  0.6893  0.0484  0.1195  0.0000  0.8573  0.00  0.85 
183  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0401  0.0401  0.00  0.00  0.07 
183  0.0087  ‐0.0068  ‐0.0005  0.0000  0.0014  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.05 




ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG  T1  T2  T3  T4 
184  ‐0.0402  ‐0.0043  0.1381  0.0000  0.0937  3.09 
184  0.7353  0.0526  0.0723  0.0000  0.8602  0.00  0.78 
184  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0419  0.0419  0.00  0.00  0.06 
184  0.0166  ‐0.0118  ‐0.0007  0.0000  0.0042  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.05 




ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG  T1  T2  T3  T4 
185  ‐0.0250  ‐0.0028  0.0981  0.0000  0.0703  4.62 
185  0.7848  0.0569  0.0414  0.0000  0.8831  0.00  0.72 
185  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0367  0.0367  0.00  0.00  0.07 
185  0.0284  ‐0.0179  ‐0.0007  0.0000  0.0098  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.05 




ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG  T1  T2  T3  T4 
186  ‐0.0164  ‐0.0019  0.0686  0.0000  0.0503  6.77 
186  0.7992  0.0597  0.0266  0.0000  0.8855  0.00  0.70 
186  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0302  0.0302  0.00  0.00  0.09 
186  0.0639  ‐0.0290  ‐0.0009  0.0000  0.0340  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.06 




ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG  T1  T2  T3  T4 
187  ‐0.0140  ‐0.0016  0.0594  0.0000  0.0438  7.85 
187  0.7721  0.0596  0.0230  0.0000  0.8547  0.00  0.71 
187  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0287  0.0287  0.00  0.00  0.09 
187  0.1100  ‐0.0360  ‐0.0011  0.0000  0.0728  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.08 





ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG  ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG  ROW SUMS 
182  ‐0.1185  ‐0.1558  0.4881  0.0000  ‐0.7663  ‐0.0731  1.8394  0  1 
182  1.1254  1.0580  0.5109  0.0000  0.7503  0.0512  0.1985  0  1 
182  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  1.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  1  1 
182  ‐0.0069  0.0978  0.0010  0.0000  ‐9.3406  9.5582  0.7824  0  1 
COLUMN SUMS  1  1  1  1 
R‐MATRICES  S‐MATRICES 
ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG  ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG 
183  ‐0.0893  ‐0.1602  0.5799  0.0000  ‐0.5650  ‐0.0568  1.6218  0  1 
183  1.0757  1.3490  0.4220  0.0000  0.8041  0.0565  0.1394  0  1 
183  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  1.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  1  1 
183  0.0136  ‐0.1888  ‐0.0019  0.0000  6.2247  ‐4.8446  ‐0.3800  0  1 
COLUMN SUMS  1  1  1  1 
R‐MATRICES  S‐MATRICES 
ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG  ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG 
184  ‐0.0564  ‐0.1166  0.6584  0.0000  ‐0.4286  ‐0.0455  1.4741  0  1 
184  1.0331  1.4386  0.3448  0.0000  0.8548  0.0611  0.0841  0  1 
184  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  1.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  1  1 
184  0.0233  ‐0.3220  ‐0.0032  0.0000  3.9742  ‐2.8160  ‐0.1582  0  1 
COLUMN SUMS  1  1  1  1 
R‐MATRICES  S‐MATRICES 
ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG  ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG 
185  ‐0.0317  ‐0.0762  0.7067  0.0000  ‐0.3554  ‐0.0394  1.3948  0  1 
185  0.9957  1.5686  0.2980  0.0000  0.8887  0.0645  0.0468  0  1 
185  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  1.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  1  1 
185  0.0360  ‐0.4924  ‐0.0047  0.0000  2.8863  ‐1.8195  ‐0.0668  0  1 
COLUMN SUMS  1  1  1  1 
R‐MATRICES  S‐MATRICES 
ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG  ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG 
186  ‐0.0194  ‐0.0644  0.7274  0.0000  ‐0.3260  ‐0.0369  1.3629  0  1 
186  0.9439  2.0700  0.2818  0.0000  0.9025  0.0674  0.0300  0  1 
186  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  1.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  1  1 
186  0.0754  ‐1.0056  ‐0.0092  0.0000  1.8788  ‐0.8533  ‐0.0255  0  1 
COLUMN SUMS  1  1  1  1 
R‐MATRICES  S‐MATRICES 
ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG  ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG 
187  ‐0.0162  ‐0.0726  0.7312  0.0000  ‐0.3203  ‐0.0365  1.3568  0  1 
187  0.8894  2.7074  0.2829  0.0000  0.9033  0.0698  0.0269  0  1 
187  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  1.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  1  1 
187  0.1267  ‐1.6349  ‐0.0141  0.0000  1.5102  ‐0.4945  ‐0.0157  0  1 





3.2.2.6. Commodity price and income elasticities 




ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG  ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG 
1  ‐3.8052  ‐0.2661  0.9382  0.0000  0.7829          
1  ‐3.1551  ‐0.3994  1.3089  0.0000  0.0000  0.5612       
1  1.4951  0.1759  ‐7.0283  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  1.3388    




ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG  ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG 
2  ‐3.7093  ‐0.2594  0.9145  0.0000  0.7632          
2  ‐3.0234  ‐0.3827  1.2542  0.0000  0.0000  0.5377       
2  1.5699  0.1847  ‐7.3801  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  1.4058    




ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG  ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG 
3  ‐3.4994  ‐0.2447  0.8628  0.0000  0.7200          
3  ‐3.0143  ‐0.3815  1.2504  0.0000  0.0000  0.5361       
3  1.7633  0.2075  ‐8.2893  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  1.5790    




ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG  ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG 
4  ‐3.1930  ‐0.2233  0.7873  0.0000  0.6570          
4  ‐3.1006  ‐0.3925  1.2863  0.0000  0.0000  0.5515       
4  2.1998  0.2588  ‐10.3413  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  1.9698    




ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG  ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG 
5  ‐2.8495  ‐0.1993  0.7026  0.0000  0.5863          
5  ‐3.4477  ‐0.4364  1.4302  0.0000  0.0000  0.6132       
5  3.1921  0.3756  ‐15.0059  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  2.8584    




ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG  ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG 
6  ‐2.6212  ‐0.1833  0.6463  0.0000  0.5393          
6  ‐4.2055  ‐0.5323  1.7446  0.0000  0.0000  0.7480       
6  4.7477  0.5586  ‐22.3189  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  4.2514    






ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG  ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG 
91  ‐2.5504  ‐0.1783  0.6288  0.0000  0.5248          
91  ‐4.8596  ‐0.6151  2.0160  0.0000  0.0000  0.8643       
91  5.9201  0.6965  ‐27.8306  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  5.3013    




ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG  ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG 
92  ‐2.5847  ‐0.1807  0.6373  0.0000  0.5318          
92  ‐4.2681  ‐0.5402  1.7706  0.0000  0.0000  0.7591       
92  5.5388  0.6517  ‐26.0380  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  4.9598    




ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG  ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG 
93  ‐2.8076  ‐0.1963  0.6922  0.0000  0.5777          
93  ‐3.3076  ‐0.4187  1.3721  0.0000  0.0000  0.5883       
93  3.5772  0.4209  ‐16.8164  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  3.2032    




ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG  ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG 
94  ‐3.2848  ‐0.2297  0.8099  0.0000  0.6759          
94  ‐2.9131  ‐0.3687  1.2085  0.0000  0.0000  0.5181       
94  2.1038  0.2475  ‐9.8902  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  1.8839    




ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG  ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG 
95  ‐3.7909  ‐0.2651  0.9347  0.0000  0.7800          
95  ‐2.8252  ‐0.3576  1.1720  0.0000  0.0000  0.5025       
95  1.5546  0.1829  ‐7.3083  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  1.3921    




ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG  ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG 
96  ‐4.1089  ‐0.2873  1.0131  0.0000  0.8454          
96  ‐2.6536  ‐0.3359  1.1008  0.0000  0.0000  0.4720       
96  1.3843  0.1629  ‐6.5077  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  1.2396    








ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG  ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG 
182  ‐3.7483  ‐0.2621  0.9242  0.0000  0.7712          
182  ‐3.6113  ‐0.4571  1.4981  0.0000  0.0000  0.6423       
182  1.5857  0.1866  ‐7.4546  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  1.4200    




ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG  ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG 
183  ‐3.4125  ‐0.2386  0.8414  0.0000  0.7021          
183  ‐4.2579  ‐0.5390  1.7664  0.0000  0.0000  0.7573       
183  1.9041  0.2240  ‐8.9512  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  1.7051    




ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG  ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG 
184  ‐3.0725  ‐0.2148  0.7575  0.0000  0.6322          
184  ‐4.1848  ‐0.5297  1.7361  0.0000  0.0000  0.7443       
184  2.5700  0.3024  ‐12.0817  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  2.3014    




ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG  ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG 
185  ‐2.7745  ‐0.1940  0.6841  0.0000  0.5709          
185  ‐4.2126  ‐0.5332  1.7476  0.0000  0.0000  0.7493       
185  3.8847  0.4570  ‐18.2618  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  3.4786    




ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG  ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG 
186  ‐2.5829  ‐0.1806  0.6368  0.0000  0.5314          
186  ‐5.3010  ‐0.6710  2.1991  0.0000  0.0000  0.9428       
186  5.7172  0.6726  ‐26.8764  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  5.1195    




ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG  ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG 
187  ‐2.5192  ‐0.1762  0.6211  0.0000  0.5184          
187  ‐6.9410  ‐0.8786  2.8794  0.0000  0.0000  1.2345       
187  6.6379  0.7810  ‐31.2047  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  5.9440    





The table above requires some comments: 
1. All the own-price elasticities are negative. Gas is the commodity with the highest 
own-price elasticity. The households are more sensitive to the change in gas price. 
This means that an increase in gas price pushes them to significantly adjust their gas 
consumption. 
2. Gas and electricity appear to be substitute. This may explain why electricity enters 
negatively the T-good 1 budget share. 
3. DFO and gas are also substitute. 
3.3. The SMIT Under the AIDS Framework 
So far, the Preference Independent Transformation technique has been exclusively 
associated with the Rotterdam model. Two reasons can be highlighted for this situation. Firstly, 
the Rotterdam model is one of the most thoroughly elaborated microeconomic models. It comes 
out after the Barten Fundamental Equation. Secondly, the Preference Independence 
Transformation is born out of the Rotterdam model setting. There is an umbilical-like cord tying 
the PIT to the Rotterdam model. It may be possible to apply it in its original form to the AIDS if 
we could identify a specific effect whose diagonalization concomitantly implies a 
diagonalization of the Hessian matrix of the utility function. 
 In this chapter, we apply the SMIT technique to the AIDS with the purpose of 
conducting a comparative analysis of the results obtained with the two frameworks. We have 
seen that the AIDS model is rival to the Rotterdam model in the literature. As in the Rotterdam 
model, we may have many levels of formulations. In its primary specification, the AIDS is 
nonlinear in the parameters as the level of price in the main equation presents a Translog 
structure. The AIDS can, however, be linearly expressed relatively to the parameters if we 
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approximate, by assumption, the level of price by the Stone’s index. We have also seen that a 
third possibility is to differentiate the AIDS in order to have what is commonly denoted as the 
Differential AIDS (DAIDS.)  
The choice of which formulation (full AIDS, LA/AIDS or DAIDS) is used depends on 
how well the Hessian matrix lends itself to the diagonalization. 
3.3.1. The matrix to be diagonalized 
The choice is between the DAIDS and the full AIDS Slutsky  matrices. From the very 
start, we eliminate the LA/AIDS Slutsky matrix because of a circularity issue raised on page 29.  












  (3.1.36) 
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  (3.1.37) 
We observe that the Hessian of the AIDS encompasses the LA/AIDS Hessian. In 
addition, it contains a quantity, i ijw  , that does not reflect any preference interdependencies 
between the goods. The quantity is however important since it scales down the diagonal of the 
Hessian matrix. For this reason, we may legitimately think that the quantity is very crucial for the 
semi-negative definiteness of the Hessian matrix. We choose to make the independent 
transformation on the full AIDS since it capture more the interaction between the commodities. 
Our goal is first to conduct the full version estimation. As in the Rotterdam model there is 
necessity to address the redundancy issue and to find the standard deviations of the dropped 
equations. Concerning the procedure to drop the last equation, we will show it while questioning 
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the possibility to use conditional demand equation. Naturally, all the estimations we perform 
below first drops one equation. Then we will show how to uncover the dropped equation 
parameters and their standard deviations. Second, we will respectively display the dynamics of 
uncompensated price ealsticities, the income elasticities, and the Hicksian price elasticities. The 
order is important in view of the fact that AIDS is derived from a cost function. There is 




3.3.2. The full AIDS estimation with all regularity conditions imposed 
3.3.2.1. The results under equation 4 dropped 
Table 16: Full version estimation 
  Equations  Obs  Parms RMSE R‐sq Constants
1  w1t  184  11 .0951748 0.3968  a0
2  w2t  184  11 .0089544 0.3992  a0
3  w3t  184  11 .0904787 0.3863  a0
     
 
  Coef.  Std. Err.  z P>z [95% Conf. Interval]
/a1  ‐1.572743  .3067773  ‐5.13 0.000 ‐2.174015  ‐.97147
/b11  .0926476  .0352658  2.63 0.009 .0235278  .1617674
/b12  .0034667  .0112238  0.31 0.757 ‐.0185316  .0254649
/b13  ‐.1024101  .0391904  ‐2.61 0.009 ‐.1792218  ‐.0255983
/q1  ‐.1562817  .0237467  ‐6.58 0.000 ‐.2028244  ‐.109739
/a0  44.20367  5.243765  8.43 0.000 33.92608  54.48126
/a2  ‐.3293933  .1723623  ‐1.91 0.056 ‐.6672171  .0084305
/a3  3.181137  .5780746  5.50 0.000 2.048131  4.314142
/b22  .0011453  .0113568  0.10 0.920 ‐.0211137  .0234044
/b23  ‐.0410222  .0200825  ‐2.04 0.041 ‐.0803832  ‐.0016612
/b33  .1904219  .0613573  3.10 0.002 .0701637  .31068
/q2  ‐.0163288  .0066383  ‐2.46 0.014 ‐.0293396  ‐.0033181
/q3  .1789558  .0214131  8.36 0.000 .1369869  .2209246
3.3.2.2. Parameter derivations and corresponding standard deviations 
Parameter derivation 
The table above shows 13 parameters: 
‐ Six parameters are ij ’s. They would be nine without the symmetry conditions.  
‐ Three parameters are i ’s and three others are i ’s. 
‐ One parameter is 0   
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The derivation of the fourth equation parameters will use the following equations:  
 
14 11 12 13
24 12 22 23
34 13 23 33
44 14 24 34 11 22 33 12 13 23
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  (3.1.38) 
The complete estimation is summarized by the following table. 
Table 17: Complete results 
Matrix ij   MATRIX MATRIX 
lprice ele lprice dfo lprice gas lprice lpg i   i   
lprice ele 0.09265 -0.15628 -1.57274
lprice dfo 0.00347 0.00115 -0.01633 -0.32939
lprice gas -0.10241 -0.04102 0.19042 0.17896 3.18114
lprice lpg 0.00630 0.03641 -0.04699 0.00428 -0.00635 -0.27900
Standard deviation 
We use the formula (3.1.12) to derive the variance-covariance of the last equation and, 
consequently, the standard deviations. 
The resulting matrix 6,6L  of the system (3.1.38) is given by the following table: 
 1   11   12   13   1  0   2   3   22   23   33   2   3   
14   0 -1 -1 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
24   0 0 -1 0 0 0 0 0 -1 -1 0 0 0 
34   0 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0 0 -1 -1 0 0 
44   0 1 2 2 0 0 0 0 1 2 1 0 0 
4   0 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 -1 




The asymptotic variance-covariance of the last equation is given by the STATA software 
can be found in appendix D.The estimated variance-covariance of the dropped equation 
parameters is given by Table 18. 
Table 18: Estimated variance-covariance for equation 4 
 14   24   34   44   4   4   
14  0.000454 
24  -4.7E-05 0.000106
34   -0.00081 6.72E-05 0.001587
44   0.000399 -0.00013 -0.00085 0.000574
4   -0.00026 3.93E-05 0.000543 -0.00032 0.00021 
4   -0.00597 0.000614 0.012294 -0.00693 0.004545 0.100835 
The resulting standard deviations are given by Table 19. 
Table 19: Standard deviations for the last equation parameters 
14   24   34   44   4   4   
.0213150182 .0102727796 .0398351603 .0239486952 .0144941367 .3175451779 
3.3.3. The matrix to be diagonalized 
Table 20: Matrix 4,4H  and corresponding roots 
 ELE DFO GAS LPG ROOTS 
ELE .85957598    1.0588 
DFO .06946257 .0699234   0.4576 
GAS -.27635391 -.06435829 .64678228  0.0606 
LPG .02388973 .00214189 -.00970955 .0507193 0.0500 
 
Before we proceed to the diagonalization, it is informative to check the dynamics of the 
Hicksian price elasticities. To the contrary of the Rotterdam model, with the AIDS model we 
first assess the dynamic of the uncompensated price elasticities. The Hicksian price elasticity 
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matrices are deduced through the Channel of the Slutsky equation matrices. We in fact have 
shown the procedure while we were computing the Hessian matrix. 
The table below shows that all uncompensated own price elasticities are negative. The 
magnitude order of the income elasticities ranks the commodities as follows: Gas, electricity, 
DFO, and LPG. 
The table Table 22 displays the dynamics of the Hicksian elasticities. As expected, all the 
direct price elasticities are negative. The highest direct price elasticities in absolute value are 
related to gas. Demand for gas is very sensitive to its price. The results show that electricity and 
gas are substitute. DFO and gas are also substitute. Only Gas and LPG are complement. 
Table 23  is related to the transformation, strictly speaking according to the SMIT. It 
reveals surprising results. Firstly, the eigenvalues of the transformation do no longer correspond 
to the transformed good expenditure elasticity. This could be understood if we consider  the 















the fact that this equation cannot be related to the eigenvalues as in the Rotterdam model. 
Secondly, it becomes possible to see basic wants that are inferior. To be precise, T-2 is an 
inferior good. We may see this as the most basic T-good. For this good, gas and LPG negatively 
enter it. This excludes heating to be the T-good. Gas contributes most on T3 and T4. Since the T 
good expenditure elasticity is higher in T3 than in T4, we may think that T3 is heating. 
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3.3.4. The dynamics of the uncompensated elasticities and income elasticities 
Table 21: uncompensated price and income elasticities 
Obs.  Commodities  Uncompensated elasticities  Commodity income elasticity 
   ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG  ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG 
1  ELE  ‐1.1864  ‐0.0340  0.4963  ‐0.0057  0.7299          
1  DFO  ‐0.3724  ‐1.0271  ‐0.0069  0.7543  0.0000  0.6521       
1  GAS  0.3503  ‐0.0400  ‐1.7041  ‐0.0992  0.0000  0.0000  1.4930    
1  LPG  ‐0.1600  3.0776  ‐2.7049  ‐0.6622  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.4494 
Obs.  Commodities  Uncompensated elasticities  Commodity income elasticity 
   ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG  ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG 
2  ELE  ‐1.1817  ‐0.0336  0.4843  ‐0.0058  0.7368          
2  DFO  ‐0.3562  ‐1.0265  ‐0.0057  0.7211  0.0000  0.6673       
2  GAS  0.3677  ‐0.0411  ‐1.7404  ‐0.1037  0.0000  0.0000  1.5174    
2  LPG  ‐0.1621  3.1151  ‐2.7372  ‐0.6584  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.4426 
Obs.  Commodities  Uncompensated elasticities  Commodity income elasticity 
   ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG  ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG 
3  ELE  ‐1.1715  ‐0.0333  0.4588  ‐0.0061  0.7521          
3  DFO  ‐0.3539  ‐1.0285  ‐0.0020  0.7144  0.0000  0.6700       
3  GAS  0.4134  ‐0.0422  ‐1.8367  ‐0.1147  0.0000  0.0000  1.5802    
3  LPG  ‐0.1591  3.0356  ‐2.6645  ‐0.6681  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.4561 
Obs.  Commodities  Uncompensated elasticities  Commodity income elasticity 
   ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG  ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG 
4  ELE  ‐1.1577  ‐0.0317  0.4214  ‐0.0065  0.7744          
4  DFO  ‐0.3689  ‐1.0316  0.0037  0.7385  0.0000  0.6582       
4  GAS  0.5195  ‐0.0482  ‐2.0536  ‐0.1398  0.0000  0.0000  1.7221    
4  LPG  ‐0.1621  3.0179  ‐2.6426  ‐0.6720  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.4587 
Obs.  Commodities  Uncompensated elasticities  Commodity income elasticity 
   ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG  ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG 
5  ELE  ‐1.1432  ‐0.0294  0.3812  ‐0.0070  0.7984          
5  DFO  ‐0.4133  ‐1.0371  0.0130  0.8162  0.0000  0.6212       
5  GAS  0.7665  ‐0.0641  ‐2.5538  ‐0.1967  0.0000  0.0000  2.0481    
5  LPG  ‐0.1835  3.2826  ‐2.8635  ‐0.6463  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.4107 
Obs.  Commodities  Uncompensated elasticities  Commodity income elasticity 
   ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG  ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG 
6  ELE  ‐1.1328  ‐0.0276  0.3533  ‐0.0069  0.8140          
6  DFO  ‐0.4952  ‐1.0454  0.0194  0.9734  0.0000  0.5478       
6  GAS  1.1494  ‐0.0919  ‐3.3318  ‐0.2896  0.0000  0.0000  2.5639    




Obs.  Commodities  Uncompensated elasticities  Commodity income elasticity 
   ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG  ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG 
116  ELE  ‐1.1456  ‐0.0276  0.3724  ‐0.0065  0.8074          
116  DFO  ‐0.3602  ‐1.0302  0.0242  0.6831  0.0000  0.6831       
116  GAS  1.1635  ‐0.0956  ‐3.2838  ‐0.2822  0.0000  0.0000  2.4982    
116  LPG  ‐0.1275  1.9925  ‐1.7223  ‐0.7852  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.6425 
Obs.  Commodities  Uncompensated elasticities  Commodity income elasticity 
   ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG  ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG 
117  ELE  ‐1.1557  ‐0.0278  0.3973  ‐0.0048  0.7910          
117  DFO  ‐0.2899  ‐1.0219  0.0113  0.5581  0.0000  0.7424       
117  GAS  0.8209  ‐0.0794  ‐2.6003  ‐0.2137  0.0000  0.0000  2.0724    
117  LPG  ‐0.0996  1.6096  ‐1.3981  ‐0.8236  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.7117 
                          
Obs.  Commodities  Uncompensated elasticities  Commodity income elasticity 
   ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG  ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG 
118  ELE  ‐1.1835  ‐0.0321  0.4678  ‐0.0054  0.7532          
118  DFO  ‐0.2542  ‐1.0186  0.0087  0.4902  0.0000  0.7738       
118  GAS  0.5064  ‐0.0509  ‐1.9857  ‐0.1328  0.0000  0.0000  1.6630    
118  LPG  ‐0.0884  1.4360  ‐1.2480  ‐0.8425  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.7429 
Obs.  Commodities  Uncompensated elasticities  Commodity income elasticity 
   ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG  ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG 
119  ELE  ‐1.2171  ‐0.0380  0.5534  ‐0.0068  0.7084          
119  DFO  ‐0.2556  ‐1.0187  0.0093  0.4922  0.0000  0.7728       
119  GAS  0.3686  ‐0.0370  ‐1.7175  ‐0.0959  0.0000  0.0000  1.4818    
119  LPG  ‐0.1059  1.7137  ‐1.4886  ‐0.8124  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.6932 
Obs.  Commodities  Uncompensated elasticities  Commodity income elasticity 
   ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG  ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG 
120  ELE  ‐1.2362  ‐0.0411  0.6024  ‐0.0073  0.6822          
120  DFO  ‐0.2877  ‐1.0209  0.0099  0.5546  0.0000  0.7440       
120  GAS  0.3208  ‐0.0326  ‐1.6244  ‐0.0837  0.0000  0.0000  1.4199    
120  LPG  ‐0.1200  1.9481  ‐1.6928  ‐0.7866  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.6513 
Obs.  Commodities  Uncompensated elasticities  Commodity income elasticity 
   ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG  ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG 
121  ELE  ‐1.2374  ‐0.0415  0.6061  ‐0.0067  0.6794          
121  DFO  ‐0.3219  ‐1.0234  0.0097  0.6228  0.0000  0.7128       
121  GAS  0.3114  ‐0.0318  ‐1.6064  ‐0.0824  0.0000  0.0000  1.4092    




Obs.  Commodities  Uncompensated elasticities  Commodity income elasticity 
   ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG  ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG 
182  ELE  ‐1.1906  ‐0.0295  0.4873  0.0002  0.7326          
182  DFO  ‐0.4019  ‐1.0229  ‐0.0127  0.8051  0.0000  0.6324       
182  GAS  0.3855  ‐0.0509  ‐1.7431  ‐0.1172  0.0000  0.0000  1.5257    
182  LPG  ‐0.0649  1.1612  ‐1.0207  ‐0.8684  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.7929 
Obs.  Commodities  Uncompensated elasticities  Commodity income elasticity 
   ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG  ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG 
183  ELE  ‐1.1732  ‐0.0292  0.4442  ‐0.0007  0.7588          
183  DFO  ‐0.4685  ‐1.0311  ‐0.0066  0.9327  0.0000  0.5735       
183  GAS  0.4619  ‐0.0539  ‐1.8962  ‐0.1373  0.0000  0.0000  1.6255    
183  LPG  ‐0.0728  1.2793  ‐1.1223  ‐0.8555  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.7714 
Obs.  Commodities  Uncompensated elasticities  Commodity income elasticity 
   ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG  ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG 
184  ELE  ‐1.1570  ‐0.0273  0.4023  ‐0.0014  0.7834          
184  DFO  ‐0.4530  ‐1.0319  0.0000  0.8949  0.0000  0.5901       
184  GAS  0.6270  ‐0.0684  ‐2.2186  ‐0.1816  0.0000  0.0000  1.8415    
184  LPG  ‐0.0789  1.3565  ‐1.1874  ‐0.8475  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.7573 
Obs.  Commodities  Uncompensated elasticities  Commodity income elasticity 
   ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG  ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG 
185  ELE  ‐1.1446  ‐0.0259  0.3693  ‐0.0025  0.8038          
185  DFO  ‐0.4547  ‐1.0343  0.0101  0.8858  0.0000  0.5931       
185  GAS  0.9658  ‐0.0954  ‐2.8786  ‐0.2670  0.0000  0.0000  2.2753    
185  LPG  ‐0.0923  1.5271  ‐1.3314  ‐0.8299  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.7265 
Obs.  Commodities  Uncompensated elasticities  Commodity income elasticity 
   ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG  ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG 
186  ELE  ‐1.1364  ‐0.0251  0.3477  ‐0.0031  0.8169          
186  DFO  ‐0.5709  ‐1.0451  0.0213  1.1021  0.0000  0.4927       
186  GAS  1.4409  ‐0.1320  ‐3.8050  ‐0.3862  0.0000  0.0000  2.8823    
186  LPG  ‐0.1144  1.8463  ‐1.6054  ‐0.7956  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.6691 
Obs.  Commodities  Uncompensated elasticities  Commodity income elasticity 
   ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG  ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG 
187  ELE  ‐1.1335  ‐0.0244  0.3398  ‐0.0032  0.8213          
187  DFO  ‐0.7437  ‐1.0583  0.0291  1.4325  0.0000  0.3404       
187  GAS  1.6786  ‐0.1545  ‐4.2637  ‐0.4473  0.0000  0.0000  3.1869    






3.3.5. The dynamics of the Hicksian elasticities 
Table 22: Hicksian elasticities 
Obs.  Commodities 
Compensated elasticities 
ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG 
1  ELE  ‐0.76417  0.00022  0.76125  0.00270 
1  DFO  0.00485  ‐0.99654  0.22984  0.76184 
1  GAS  1.21396  0.03012  ‐1.16213  ‐0.08194 
1  LPG  0.10001  3.09866  ‐2.54169  ‐0.65698 
Obs.  Commodities 
Compensated elasticities 
ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG 
2  ELE  ‐0.74427  0.00257  0.73910  0.00260 
2  DFO  0.04003  ‐0.99375  0.22506  0.72866 
2  GAS  1.26862  0.03339  ‐1.21563  ‐0.08638 
2  LPG  0.10067  3.13685  ‐2.58417  ‐0.65335 
Obs.  Commodities 
Compensated elasticities 
ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG 
3  ELE  ‐0.69736  0.00391  0.69077  0.00268 
3  DFO  0.06851  ‐0.99536  0.20461  0.72224 
3  GAS  1.40960  0.03601  ‐1.34934  ‐0.09627 
3  LPG  0.12850  3.05817  ‐2.52385  ‐0.66282 
Obs.  Commodities 
Compensated elasticities 
ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG 
4  ELE  ‐0.62130  0.00535  0.61336  0.00259 
4  DFO  0.08706  ‐1.00010  0.16687  0.74617 
4  GAS  1.71228  0.03407  ‐1.62678  ‐0.11957 
4  LPG  0.15565  3.03981  ‐2.52887  ‐0.66659 
Obs.  Commodities 
Compensated elasticities 
ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG 
5  ELE  ‐0.52415  0.00501  0.51752  0.00161 
5  DFO  0.06837  ‐1.01033  0.11907  0.82289 
5  GAS  2.35452  0.02423  ‐2.20412  ‐0.17463 
5  LPG  0.13494  3.30031  ‐2.79337  ‐0.64188 
Obs.  Commodities 
Compensated elasticities 
ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG 
6  ELE  ‐0.44868  0.00182  0.44643  0.00044 
6  DFO  ‐0.03480  ‐1.02559  0.08206  0.97833 
6  GAS  3.30426  0.00067  ‐3.03846  ‐0.26646 






ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG 
116  ELE  ‐0.49065  0.01401  0.46884  0.00779 
116  DFO  0.19399  ‐0.99499  0.10575  0.69525 
116  GAS  3.19020  0.03308  ‐2.98543  ‐0.23785 
116  LPG  0.39368  2.02560  ‐1.64552  ‐0.77377 
Obs.  Commodities 
Compensated elasticities 
ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG 
117  ELE  ‐0.56424  0.02234  0.52930  0.01259 
117  DFO  0.26522  ‐0.97485  0.13521  0.57441 
117  GAS  2.37054  0.05197  ‐2.25443  ‐0.16808 
117  LPG  0.43253  1.65474  ‐1.27931  ‐0.80796 
Obs.  Commodities 
Compensated elasticities 
ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG 
118  ELE  ‐0.70654  0.02224  0.67114  0.01316 
118  DFO  0.23580  ‐0.96274  0.21759  0.50934 
118  GAS  1.55943  0.06912  ‐1.53681  ‐0.09173 
118  LPG  0.38199  1.48965  ‐1.04752  ‐0.82413 
Obs.  Commodities 
Compensated elasticities 
ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG 
119  ELE  ‐0.83734  0.01295  0.81653  0.00786 
119  DFO  0.15858  ‐0.96315  0.29637  0.50821 
119  GAS  1.16288  0.06946  ‐1.16711  ‐0.06523 
119  LPG  0.26568  1.76349  ‐1.23111  ‐0.79806 
Obs.  Commodities 
Compensated elasticities 
ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG 
120  ELE  ‐0.90068  0.00238  0.89315  0.00514 
120  DFO  0.07827  ‐0.97340  0.32703  0.56810 
120  GAS  1.01917  0.05801  ‐1.01928  ‐0.05790 
120  LPG  0.20034  1.98966  ‐1.41524  ‐0.77476 
Obs.  Commodities 
Compensated elasticities 
ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG 
121  ELE  ‐0.90616  ‐0.00283  0.90321  0.00578 
121  DFO  0.02555  ‐0.98284  0.32138  0.63592 
121  GAS  0.99839  0.04832  ‐0.99010  ‐0.05661 






ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG 
182  ELE  ‐0.76237  0.00305  0.73670  0.02262 
182  DFO  ‐0.03230  ‐0.99483  0.20261  0.82452 
182  GAS  1.27728  0.01692  ‐1.22373  ‐0.07047 
182  LPG  0.39850  1.19638  ‐0.75080  ‐0.84408 
Obs.  Commodities 
Compensated elasticities 
ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG 
183  ELE  ‐0.68160  ‐0.00012  0.66132  0.02040 
183  DFO  ‐0.09693  ‐1.00916  0.15751  0.94858 
183  GAS  1.51501  0.00836  ‐1.43114  ‐0.09223 
183  LPG  0.42690  1.30881  ‐0.90164  ‐0.83407 
Obs.  Commodities 
Compensated elasticities 
ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG 
184  ELE  ‐0.59189  0.00395  0.56887  0.01907 
184  DFO  ‐0.02736  ‐1.00840  0.12544  0.91033 
184  GAS  1.95543  0.00497  ‐1.82699  ‐0.13341 
184  LPG  0.46741  1.38669  ‐1.02636  ‐0.82774 
Obs.  Commodities 
Compensated elasticities 
ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG 
185  ELE  ‐0.50453  0.00630  0.48211  0.01612 
185  DFO  0.01761  ‐1.01049  0.09337  0.89951 
185  GAS  2.77770  ‐0.00412  ‐2.55934  ‐0.21423 
185  LPG  0.48628  1.55621  ‐1.22942  ‐0.81307 
Obs. 
Commodities  Compensated elasticities 
ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG 
186  ELE  ‐0.43911  0.00122  0.42536  0.01253 
186  DFO  ‐0.15040  ‐1.02928  0.06817  1.11151 
186  GAS  3.90108  ‐0.03918  ‐3.53098  ‐0.33091 
186  LPG  0.45673  1.86781  ‐1.54178  ‐0.78276 
Obs.  Commodities 
Compensated elasticities 
ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG 
187  ELE  ‐0.41530  ‐0.00405  0.40697  0.01238 
187  DFO  ‐0.44607  ‐1.04991  0.05699  1.43899 
187  GAS  4.46549  ‐0.07562  ‐4.00293  ‐0.38695 












ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG 
1  0.0150  0.0022  ‐0.0091  0.0167  0.0249  4.4584  0.2568 
1  0.0318  0.0086  ‐0.0326  ‐0.0014  0.0064  2.5739  ‐3.1782 
1  ‐0.0386  0.0735  0.1259  0.0005  0.1613  1.1242  1.2892 
1  0.5702  ‐0.0374  0.2788  ‐0.0042  0.8074  1.0013  0.9984 
SUM  0.5785  0.0469  0.3630  0.0115  1.0000 
Composition matrices 
Sum  Roots  T‐Exp. Elast. 
ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG 
2  0.0144  0.0021  ‐0.0088  0.0163  0.0239  4.5121  0.2429 
2  0.0218  0.0058  ‐0.0235  ‐0.0010  0.0032  2.5906  ‐5.1063 
2  0.0305  0.1032  0.1956  ‐0.0001  0.3292  1.1062  1.1789 
2  0.5270  ‐0.0620  0.1825  ‐0.0039  0.6437  0.9893  0.9666 
SUM  0.5937  0.0491  0.3458  0.0114  1.0000 
Composition matrices 
Sum  Roots  T‐Exp. Elast. 
ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG 
3  0.0149  0.0022  ‐0.0100  0.0163  0.0235  4.4071  0.1879 
3  0.0012  0.0003  ‐0.0015  ‐0.0001  0.0000  2.7148  ‐100.3316 
3  0.1067  0.1160  0.2063  ‐0.0008  0.4282  1.1421  1.1294 
3  0.5076  ‐0.0691  0.1136  ‐0.0037  0.5483  0.9568  0.9360 
SUM  0.6304  0.0495  0.3084  0.0117  1.0000 
Composition matrices 
Sum  Roots  T‐Exp. Elast. 
ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG 
4  0.0153  0.0026  ‐0.0123  0.0152  0.0207  4.4007  ‐0.0370 
4  ‐0.0208  ‐0.0059  0.0302  0.0018  0.0053  3.0982  6.2109 
4  0.1248  0.1147  0.1480  ‐0.0012  0.3863  1.2357  1.1039 
4  0.5733  ‐0.0636  0.0820  ‐0.0040  0.5877  0.9059  0.9213 
SUM  0.6927  0.0478  0.2478  0.0117  1.0000 
Composition matrices 
Sum  Roots  T‐Exp. Elast. 
ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG 
5  0.0131  0.0027  ‐0.0156  0.0090  0.0093  4.8696  ‐1.7254 
5  ‐0.0277  ‐0.0084  0.0523  0.0069  0.0231  4.0976  3.5757 
5  0.1034  0.0997  0.0779  ‐0.0011  0.2798  1.4180  1.0848 
5  0.6865  ‐0.0509  0.0561  ‐0.0040  0.6878  0.8441  0.9157 
SUM  0.7754  0.0431  0.1707  0.0108  1.0000 
Composition matrices 
Sum  Roots  T‐Exp. Elast. 
ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG 
6  ‐0.0041  ‐0.0010  0.0070  ‐0.0012  0.0006  6.2926  21.8365 
6  ‐0.0082  ‐0.0037  0.0279  0.0145  0.0304  5.4284  2.2055 
6  0.0707  0.0779  0.0409  ‐0.0008  0.1888  1.7136  1.0859 
6  0.7821  ‐0.0371  0.0386  ‐0.0035  0.7802  0.8006  0.9156 





ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG  ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG 
1  0.0260  0.0467  ‐0.0249  1.4472  0.6051  0.0882  ‐0.3644  0.6710  1.0000 
1  0.0550  0.1836  ‐0.0898  ‐0.1226  4.9466  1.3385  ‐5.0656  ‐0.2194  1.0000 
1  ‐0.0667  1.5655  0.3467  0.0425  ‐0.2392  0.4557  0.7805  0.0030  1.0000 
1  0.9856  ‐0.7958  0.7681  ‐0.3671  0.7062  ‐0.0463  0.3453  ‐0.0052  1.0000 
SUM  1  1  1  1 
R‐matrices  S‐matrices 
ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG  ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG 
2  0.0243  0.0421  ‐0.0255  1.4296  0.6019  0.0865  ‐0.3686  0.6802  1.0000 
2  0.0367  0.1178  ‐0.0679  ‐0.0843  6.9091  1.8309  ‐7.4362  ‐0.3038  1.0000 
2  0.0513  2.1026  0.5656  ‐0.0062  0.0925  0.3135  0.5942  ‐0.0002  1.0000 
2  0.8877  ‐1.2625  0.5278  ‐0.3391  0.8187  ‐0.0963  0.2836  ‐0.0060  1.0000 
SUM  1  1  1  1 
R‐matrices  S‐matrices 
ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG  ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG 
3  0.0237  0.0453  ‐0.0323  1.3947  0.6353  0.0954  ‐0.4241  0.6933  1.0000 
3  0.0020  0.0068  ‐0.0048  ‐0.0057  0.4979  27.1899  ‐1.2130  ‐5.3934  1.0000 
3  0.1692  2.3450  0.6689  ‐0.0687  0.2491  0.2710  0.4818  ‐0.0019  1.0000 
3  0.8052  ‐1.3971  0.3682  ‐0.3202  0.9258  ‐0.1261  0.2071  ‐0.0068  1.0000 
SUM  1  1  1  1 
R‐matrices  S‐matrices 
ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG  ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG 
4  0.0221  0.0535  ‐0.0498  1.2924  0.7402  0.1236  ‐0.5968  0.7330  1.0000 
4  ‐0.0300  ‐0.1229  0.1218  0.1502  ‐3.9333  ‐1.1113  5.7114  0.3332  1.0000 
4  0.1802  2.4006  0.5971  ‐0.1007  0.3231  0.2969  0.3830  ‐0.0031  1.0000 
4  0.8277  ‐1.3312  0.3309  ‐0.3419  0.9755  ‐0.1082  0.1396  ‐0.0068  1.0000 
SUM  1  1  1  1 
R‐matrices  S‐matrices 
ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG  ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG 
5  0.0170  0.0630  ‐0.0911  0.8322  1.4181  0.2931  ‐1.6781  0.9669  1.0000 
5  ‐0.0357  ‐0.1950  0.3063  0.6431  ‐1.1996  ‐0.3640  2.2638  0.2998  1.0000 
5  0.1334  2.3118  0.4562  ‐0.1046  0.3695  0.3561  0.2784  ‐0.0040  1.0000 
5  0.8854  ‐1.1797  0.3286  ‐0.3708  0.9982  ‐0.0739  0.0816  ‐0.0058  1.0000 
SUM  1  1  1  1 
R‐matrices  S‐matrices 
ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG  ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG 
6  ‐0.0049  ‐0.0288  0.0608  ‐0.1277  ‐6.6810  ‐1.6753  11.2105  ‐1.8542  1.0000 
6  ‐0.0098  ‐0.1027  0.2439  1.6024  ‐0.2704  ‐0.1218  0.9172  0.4750  1.0000 
6  0.0842  2.1577  0.3578  ‐0.0896  0.3747  0.4127  0.2169  ‐0.0043  1.0000 
6  0.9306  ‐1.0262  0.3375  ‐0.3852  1.0024  ‐0.0475  0.0495  ‐0.0045  1.0000 







ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG 
116  ‐0.0173  ‐0.0043  0.0322  ‐0.0011  0.0095  5.7833  6.6329 
116  0.0120  0.0002  0.0080  0.0295  0.0497  2.8482  0.9805 
116  0.1962  0.1236  0.0527  ‐0.0041  0.3684  1.2592  1.0094 
116  0.6204  ‐0.0680  0.0266  ‐0.0064  0.5725  0.7985  0.9026 
SUM  0.8113  0.0515  0.1194  0.0177  1.0000 
Composition matrices 
Sum  Roots  T‐Exp. Elast. 
ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG 
117  ‐0.0191  ‐0.0045  0.0320  ‐0.0013  0.0070  4.2585  6.6670 
117  0.0155  ‐0.0002  0.0141  0.0381  0.0674  2.2958  1.0143 
117  0.4340  0.1499  0.1102  ‐0.0102  0.6839  1.0817  0.9881 
117  0.3174  ‐0.0817  0.0105  ‐0.0045  0.2417  0.7972  0.8646 
SUM  0.7477  0.0634  0.1669  0.0220  1.0000 
Composition matrices 
Sum  Roots  T‐Exp. Elast. 
ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG 
118  0.0084  0.0018  ‐0.0104  0.0009  0.0006  2.9311  ‐15.3566 
118  0.0009  ‐0.0042  0.0338  0.0405  0.0710  2.0228  1.1786 
118  0.6122  0.0832  0.2482  ‐0.0165  0.9271  1.0471  0.9988 
118  0.0117  ‐0.0086  ‐0.0016  ‐0.0002  0.0013  0.7762  ‐0.5729 
SUM  0.6332  0.0722  0.2699  0.0247  1.0000 
Composition matrices 
Sum  Roots  T‐Exp. Elast. 
ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG 
119  0.0792  0.0138  ‐0.0656  0.0220  0.0494  2.7092  ‐0.3080 
119  ‐0.0206  ‐0.0047  0.0229  0.0075  0.0052  2.2316  4.0234 
119  0.5167  0.0034  0.3795  ‐0.0094  0.8903  1.0427  1.0385 
119  ‐0.0394  0.0593  0.0346  0.0005  0.0551  0.7867  1.2638 
SUM  0.5360  0.0719  0.3714  0.0207  1.0000 
Composition matrices 
Sum  Roots  T‐Exp. Elast. 
ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG 
120  0.0647  0.0104  ‐0.0436  0.0288  0.0603  2.9431  0.1441 
120  0.0328  0.0068  ‐0.0280  ‐0.0052  0.0062  2.3175  ‐2.5378 
120  0.4240  ‐0.0547  0.3671  ‐0.0059  0.7305  1.0275  1.0486 
120  ‐0.0296  0.1014  0.1307  0.0005  0.2030  0.8606  1.1881 
SUM  0.4918  0.0638  0.4262  0.0182  1.0000 
Composition matrices 
Sum  Roots  T‐Exp. Elast. 
ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG 
121  0.0704  0.0120  ‐0.0473  0.0292  0.0642  2.9358  0.1368 
121  0.0320  0.0071  ‐0.0270  ‐0.0057  0.0064  2.3371  ‐2.3332 
121  0.3393  ‐0.0835  0.2167  ‐0.0050  0.4674  1.0398  1.0120 
121  0.0459  0.1213  0.2950  ‐0.0001  0.4619  0.9257  1.1542 





ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG  ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG 
116  ‐0.0213  ‐0.0831  0.2693  ‐0.0636  ‐1.8286  ‐0.4526  3.4005  ‐0.1193  1.0000 
116  0.0148  0.0038  0.0667  1.6607  0.2420  0.0039  0.1606  0.5935  1.0000 
116  0.2418  2.3997  0.4412  ‐0.2338  0.5326  0.3356  0.1431  ‐0.0113  1.0000 
116  0.7647  ‐1.3204  0.2227  ‐0.3633  1.0836  ‐0.1188  0.0465  ‐0.0113  1.0000 
SUM  1  1  1  1 
R‐matrices  S‐matrices 
ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG  ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG 
117  ‐0.0256  ‐0.0713  0.1919  ‐0.0611  ‐2.7164  ‐0.6419  4.5493  ‐0.1910  1.0000 
117  0.0207  ‐0.0039  0.0844  1.7302  0.2295  ‐0.0036  0.2091  0.5650  1.0000 
117  0.5804  2.3645  0.6607  ‐0.4650  0.6346  0.2192  0.1612  ‐0.0150  1.0000 
117  0.4245  ‐1.2893  0.0630  ‐0.2040  1.3133  ‐0.3382  0.0435  ‐0.0186  1.0000 
SUM  1  1  1  1 
R‐matrices  S‐matrices 
ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG  ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG 
118  0.0133  0.0246  ‐0.0387  0.0344  14.2919  3.0205  ‐1.7759  1.4469  1.0000 
118  0.0015  ‐0.0582  0.1251  1.6421  0.0132  ‐0.0592  0.4754  0.5707  1.0000 
118  0.9668  1.1529  0.9196  ‐0.6688  0.6603  0.0898  0.2677  ‐0.0178  1.0000 
118  0.0185  ‐0.1193  ‐0.0061  ‐0.0077  9.3208  ‐6.8648  ‐1.3035  ‐0.1524  1.0000 
SUM  1  1  1  1 
R‐matrices  S‐matrices 
ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG  ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG 
119  0.1478  0.1917  ‐0.1767  1.0647  1.6040  0.2789  ‐1.3288  0.4459  1.0000 
119  ‐0.0384  ‐0.0648  0.0618  0.3627  ‐3.9325  ‐0.8911  4.3888  1.4347  1.0000 
119  0.9641  0.0479  1.0217  ‐0.4532  0.5804  0.0039  0.4262  ‐0.0105  1.0000 
119  ‐0.0735  0.8252  0.0932  0.0259  ‐0.7153  1.0768  0.6287  0.0097  1.0000 
SUM  1  1  1  1 
R‐matrices  S‐matrices 
ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG  ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG 
120  0.1316  0.1623  ‐0.1024  1.5830  1.0741  0.1718  ‐0.7239  0.4780  1.0000 
120  0.0666  0.1058  ‐0.0658  ‐0.2873  5.2472  1.0812  ‐4.4910  ‐0.8375  1.0000 
120  0.8621  ‐0.8570  0.8614  ‐0.3246  0.5804  ‐0.0748  0.5025  ‐0.0081  1.0000 
120  ‐0.0603  1.5889  0.3067  0.0289  ‐0.1461  0.4994  0.6440  0.0026  1.0000 
SUM  1  1  1  1 
R‐matrices  S‐matrices 
ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG  ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG 
121  0.1443  0.2102  ‐0.1081  1.5915  1.0956  0.1861  ‐0.7361  0.4544  1.0000 
121  0.0657  0.1251  ‐0.0618  ‐0.3097  4.9862  1.1078  ‐4.2095  ‐0.8845  1.0000 
121  0.6959  ‐1.4684  0.4954  ‐0.2739  0.7258  ‐0.1786  0.4635  ‐0.0107  1.0000 
121  0.0941  2.1331  0.6745  ‐0.0079  0.0993  0.2625  0.6385  ‐0.0003  1.0000 







ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG 
182  0.0499  0.0132  ‐0.0506  0.0037  0.0162  2.7669  ‐1.8196 
182  0.0094  ‐0.0085  0.0259  0.0460  0.0728  1.6392  1.0641 
182  ‐0.0236  0.0790  0.1468  0.0029  0.2051  1.1899  1.2626 
182  0.5488  ‐0.0393  0.2184  ‐0.0220  0.7059  1.0044  0.9817 
SUM  0.5845  0.0444  0.3404  0.0306  1.0000 
Composition matrices 
Sum  Roots  T‐Exp. Elast. 
ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG 
183  0.0223  0.0067  ‐0.0262  0.0017  0.0045  3.0768  ‐4.6198 
183  0.0115  ‐0.0065  0.0196  0.0422  0.0669  1.8133  1.0389 
183  ‐0.0056  0.0735  0.1402  0.0019  0.2101  1.3913  1.2724 
183  0.6196  ‐0.0355  0.1525  ‐0.0181  0.7186  0.9601  0.9515 
SUM  0.6479  0.0383  0.2861  0.0278  1.0000 
Composition matrices 
Sum  Roots  T‐Exp. Elast. 
ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG 
184  ‐0.0072  ‐0.0021  0.0105  ‐0.0005  0.0007  3.6417  17.0301 
184  0.0185  ‐0.0017  0.0192  0.0456  0.0816  1.9319  1.0218 
184  0.0573  0.0864  0.1013  ‐0.0040  0.2411  1.4608  1.1592 
184  0.6527  ‐0.0429  0.0816  ‐0.0149  0.6766  0.8937  0.9238 
SUM  0.7214  0.0398  0.2127  0.0261  1.0000 
Composition matrices 
Sum 
ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG 
185  ‐0.0170  ‐0.0046  0.0299  ‐0.0010  0.0073  5.0670  6.9702 
185  0.0208  0.0013  0.0110  0.0411  0.0742  2.1845  0.9744 
185  0.0845  0.0872  0.0543  ‐0.0053  0.2207  1.5358  1.0846 
185  0.7081  ‐0.0438  0.0451  ‐0.0116  0.6978  0.8298  0.9135 
SUM  0.7963  0.0401  0.1403  0.0232  1.0000 
Composition matrices 
Sum  Roots  T‐Exp. Elast. 
ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG 
186  ‐0.0141  ‐0.0039  0.0272  ‐0.0007  0.0085  7.2680  7.5868 
186  0.0165  0.0018  0.0062  0.0329  0.0574  2.6438  0.9436 
186  0.0533  0.0648  0.0297  ‐0.0038  0.1440  1.9226  1.1009 
186  0.7978  ‐0.0306  0.0320  ‐0.0092  0.7900  0.7932  0.9149 
SUM  0.8536  0.0322  0.0951  0.0192  1.0000 
Composition matrices 
Sum  Roots  T‐Exp. Elast. 
ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG 
187  ‐0.0120  ‐0.0035  0.0236  ‐0.0006  0.0075  8.4613  8.5310 
187  0.0230  0.0082  0.0091  0.0372  0.0775  2.6852  0.9739 
187  0.0245  0.0410  0.0202  ‐0.0084  0.0774  2.4612  1.2016 
187  0.8390  ‐0.0210  0.0289  ‐0.0093  0.8376  0.7824  0.9167 






ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG  ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG 
182  0.0853  0.2974  ‐0.1487  0.1210  3.0856  0.8174  ‐3.1324  0.2294  1.0000 
182  0.0162  ‐0.1912  0.0760  1.5019  0.1297  ‐0.1166  0.3552  0.6316  1.0000 
182  ‐0.0404  1.7788  0.4313  0.0941  ‐0.1152  0.3853  0.7159  0.0141  1.0000 
182  0.9389  ‐0.8850  0.6415  ‐0.7170  0.7774  ‐0.0557  0.3094  ‐0.0311  1.0000 
SUM  1  1  1  1 
R‐matrices  S‐matrices 
ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG  ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG 
183  0.0344  0.1758  ‐0.0917  0.0602  5.0015  1.5113  ‐5.8881  0.3753  1.0000 
183  0.0178  ‐0.1697  0.0685  1.5211  0.1726  ‐0.0972  0.2932  0.6313  1.0000 
183  ‐0.0086  1.9205  0.4901  0.0703  ‐0.0265  0.3499  0.6673  0.0093  1.0000 
183  0.9564  ‐0.9267  0.5330  ‐0.6516  0.8623  ‐0.0494  0.2122  ‐0.0252  1.0000 
SUM  1  1  1  1 
R‐matrices  S‐matrices 
ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG  ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG 
184  ‐0.0100  ‐0.0522  0.0495  ‐0.0187  ‐10.1895  ‐2.9250  14.8023  ‐0.6878  1.0000 
184  0.0257  ‐0.0421  0.0903  1.7420  0.2272  ‐0.0205  0.2353  0.5580  1.0000 
184  0.0794  2.1704  0.4764  ‐0.1534  0.2377  0.3586  0.4203  ‐0.0166  1.0000 
184  0.9049  ‐1.0761  0.3838  ‐0.5699  0.9648  ‐0.0634  0.1206  ‐0.0220  1.0000 
SUM  1  1  1  1 
R‐matrices  S‐matrices 
ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG  ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG 
185  ‐0.0214  ‐0.1146  0.2131  ‐0.0423  ‐2.3296  ‐0.6296  4.0934  ‐0.1342  1.0000 
185  0.0262  0.0331  0.0781  1.7711  0.2809  0.0179  0.1476  0.5536  1.0000 
185  0.1060  2.1733  0.3872  ‐0.2273  0.3826  0.3951  0.2462  ‐0.0239  1.0000 
185  0.8891  ‐1.0918  0.3217  ‐0.5015  1.0148  ‐0.0628  0.0647  ‐0.0167  1.0000 
SUM  1  1  1  1 
R‐matrices  S‐matrices 
ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG  ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG 
186  ‐0.0165  ‐0.1197  0.2859  ‐0.0387  ‐1.6595  ‐0.4536  3.2004  ‐0.0873  1.0000 
186  0.0193  0.0561  0.0648  1.7182  0.2875  0.0314  0.1073  0.5737  1.0000 
186  0.0625  2.0148  0.3125  ‐0.2002  0.3702  0.4502  0.2063  ‐0.0266  1.0000 
186  0.9347  ‐0.9512  0.3368  ‐0.4794  1.0099  ‐0.0388  0.0405  ‐0.0116  1.0000 
SUM  1  1  1  1 
R‐matrices  S‐matrices 
ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG  ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG 
187  ‐0.0138  ‐0.1402  0.2881  ‐0.0313  ‐1.6146  ‐0.4652  3.1592  ‐0.0794  1.0000 
187  0.0263  0.3305  0.1115  1.9658  0.2964  0.1056  0.1177  0.4803  1.0000 
187  0.0280  1.6576  0.2473  ‐0.4422  0.3167  0.5301  0.2614  ‐0.1082  1.0000 
187  0.9595  ‐0.8479  0.3532  ‐0.4923  1.0017  ‐0.0251  0.0345  ‐0.0111  1.0000 




3.3.7. Comparative analysis between the two model results 
It is logical to check if we could have close results between the two models. The 
differences can be directly observed comparing the composition matrices of the two models for 
each period. It should be noted that the results of the two models will be even closer than the two 
matrices to be diagonalized are identical. 
Table 24 shows that for both models T2 has the highest budget share. They also classify the 
t-goods in the same order. Except that, they produce different results. The T-good expenditure 
elasticities are higher with the AIDS model framework. The analysis of these juxtaposed results 
makes us state that choosing a specific demand system is equivalent to putting additional 
assumptions on the household behavior. 
The gap in the results of the two models is a stimulus for looking for a third approach of 
uncovering the basic wants. One question that arises is to wonder if it is possible to predefine the 
basic wants and a standard composition matrix that enables us to make the arbitrage between 
different models serving as Preference Independent Transformation platform. 












ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG  E  ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG 
1  ‐0.073  ‐0.007  0.165  0.000  0.085  1.870  0.015  0.002  ‐0.009  0.017  0.025  4.458  0.257 
1  0.657  0.044  0.195  0.000  0.896  0.890  0.032  0.009  ‐0.033  ‐0.001  0.006  2.574  ‐3.178 
1  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.016  0.016  0.160  ‐0.039  0.074  0.126  0.001  0.161  1.124  1.289 
1  ‐0.009  0.011  0.001  0.000  0.003  0.040  0.570  ‐0.037  0.279  ‐0.004  0.807  1.001  0.998 




 ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG  ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG 
2  ‐0.070  ‐0.007  0.170  0.000  0.093  1.950  0.014  0.002  ‐0.009  0.016  0.024  4.512  0.243 
2  0.669  0.045  0.173  0.000  0.888  0.880  0.022  0.006  ‐0.024  ‐0.001  0.003  2.591  ‐5.106 
2  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.016  0.016  0.160  0.031  0.103  0.196  0.000  0.329  1.106  1.179 
2  ‐0.010  0.012  0.001  0.000  0.003  0.040  0.527  ‐0.062  0.183  ‐0.004  0.644  0.989  0.967 




 ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG  ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG 
3  ‐0.062  ‐0.006  0.171  0.000  0.103  2.160  0.015  0.002  ‐0.010  0.016  0.024  4.407  0.188 
3  0.695  0.048  0.134  0.000  0.877  0.840  0.001  0.000  ‐0.002  0.000  0.000  2.715  ‐100.3 
3  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.019  0.019  0.140  0.107  0.116  0.206  ‐0.001  0.428  1.142  1.129 
3  ‐0.008  0.009  0.001  0.000  0.002  0.040  0.508  ‐0.069  0.114  ‐0.004  0.548  0.957  0.936 




 ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG  ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG 
4  ‐0.048  ‐0.005  0.155  0.000  0.102  2.660  0.015  0.003  ‐0.012  0.015  0.021  4.401  ‐0.037 
4  0.736  0.051  0.090  0.000  0.877  0.790  ‐0.021  ‐0.006  0.030  0.002  0.005  3.098  6.211 
4  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.021  0.021  0.130  0.125  0.115  0.148  ‐0.001  0.386  1.236  1.104 
4  ‐0.003  0.003  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.040  0.573  ‐0.064  0.082  ‐0.004  0.588  0.906  0.921 




 ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG  ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG 
5  ‐0.031  ‐0.003  0.117  0.000  0.083  3.810  0.013  0.003  ‐0.016  0.009  0.009  4.870  ‐1.725 
5  0.788  0.056  0.052  0.000  0.897  0.720  ‐0.028  ‐0.008  0.052  0.007  0.023  4.098  3.576 
5  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.019  0.019  0.140  0.103  0.100  0.078  ‐0.001  0.280  1.418  1.085 
5  0.011  ‐0.008  0.000  0.000  0.002  0.040  0.687  ‐0.051  0.056  ‐0.004  0.688  0.844  0.916 




 ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG  ELE  DFO  GAS  LPG 
6  ‐0.020  ‐0.002  0.082  0.000  0.060  5.630  ‐0.004  ‐0.001  0.007  ‐0.001  0.001  6.293  21.84 
6  0.819  0.060  0.032  0.000  0.911  0.680  ‐0.008  ‐0.004  0.028  0.015  0.030  5.428  2.206 
6  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.016  0.016  0.170  0.071  0.078  0.041  ‐0.001  0.189  1.714  1.086 
6  0.036  ‐0.021  ‐0.001  0.000  0.014  0.050  0.782  ‐0.037  0.039  ‐0.004  0.780  0.801  0.916 
SUM  0.834  0.036  0.114  0.016  1.000 
 





4. Essay on identifying the T-goods 
Though the Preference Independence Technique is deduced with a rare and noticeable 
mathematical rigor, its originators (Brooks, and Theil) and followers did not take much risk to 
clearly identify the T goods with some economically meaningful basic wants. At most, they 
could use the income elasticity of the T goods and how the commodities enter to the T goods 
budget share to give them an economic meaning. The current state of the optimization software 
progress and data availability may allow the exploration of more ways to identify  the goods. 
We have seen that depending on the system of demand model we use, the results we 
obtain are different. This last chapter responds to a need to find a more decisive way of 
uncovering the basic wants.  
We strive to push one step ahead in the research on the possibility of identifying the T-
goods. We will mainly use the definition and the properties of the transformation matrix as stated 
previously. We will show that by pre-defininig the basic wants, the stock of data available 
enables to directly compute empirical T matrices, and hence resulting empirical transformation 
matrices. This computation is a noticeable advance in gaining certainty and precision while 
identifying the T-goods. Even if the data could not fully recover the transformation matrices, we 
will display a second order solution when only the knowledge of the budget shares of the 
commodities and the budget shares of the basic wants—statistically found—are available. In that 
case, we show that it is possible to approximate the T matrix and, hence, the composition 
matrices , , and .n n n nR S   
4.1. Preliminary discussions 
The Energy Information Administration reports an Annual Energy Outlook that provides 
“delivered energy consumption by fuel” every year, at least since 2008.” This can easily be 
computed as empirical T-matrices. We will denote them as *,n nT .Before we proceed to their 
computation, some clarifications on the assumptions that found the Preference Independence 
Transformation are important: 
‐ The number of commodities equals the number of basic wants. 
‐ The basic wants are independent. 
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‐ The basic wants are normal goods in the sense that increasing the consumer 
purchasing power increases its consumption of these goods. This is true for the 
PIT, not for the SMIT. 
In practice, the number of basic wants is in most of the cases different from the number 
of commodities. In our case The Energy Information Administration refers to them as end uses 
although end uses and basic wants do not exactly correspond. The EIA takes into account, to 
name the most important, space heating, water heating, space cooling, refrigeration, cooking, and 
lighting. It is clear that some end uses should not be assimilated to basic wants. If we do, then the 
basic want would not be independent. For example, refrigeration is not preference independent 
from cooking, and cooking is not preference independent from heating. And yet, a Basic want 
should not have another basic want as substitute or complement. Therefore, the pre-definition of 
basic want should strictly observe the preference independence assumption.   
 Another aspect of the problem is the difficulty of reconciling the first two assumptions 
above mentioned. In order to attain this, we should consider one of the T-good as a composite of 
basic wants that are not too relevant to the analysis. Hence, if we consider three goods—for 
example, electricity, liquefied petroleum, and gas—we may consider three basic wants (heating, 
cooling, and T-3). We call the third basic want T-3 as it is a composite of negligible basic wants. 
In this example, it is obvious that heating and cooling are preference independent. Let us take the 
example of four goods (electicity, dfo, gas, lpg) as in our previous chapters. In that case we 
should consider three of our most relevant basic wants plus T-4, the composite of residual basic 
wants. The three most important basic wants are heating (space heating and water heating), 
cooling and lighting. One may raise the issue however that lighting and heating may not be 
completely preference independent. From this issue we infer that the more goods we add, the less 
plausible is the basic want preference independence assumption. 
From an empirical point of view, two cases may arise: 




1. Table 25 reports these matrices from 2009 to 2012. In those cases, the results 
obtained provide valuable information in identifying the T-goods. The resulting 
transformation matrices can be easily computed. We use for that the following two 
equations: 
 * * 1( )R T w   (4.1.1) 
 * * ' 1( )S R   (4.1.2) 
We assign a star to refer to the empirical aspect of the matrices. This is the case whenever 
the composition or transformation matrices are statistically determined. 
2. The data are not available. This is the case in most poor countries. In that case a 
statistical survey may help find the budget shares of the T-goods as well as the budget 
shares of the commodities. However, determining a plausible empirical T matrix may 
be more challenging as it may require a minimax optimization.  
In the next section, we will expound some US empirical composition matrices spanning 
from 2009 to 2012. From these *T , we will deduce the transformation matrices * * and R S . In 
section 04.3, we will introduce the possibility of approaching the empirical composition matrices 
when only the budget shares are available.   
4.2. On uncovering the transformation matrices when *T  is available 
In this section, we construct the empirical composition matrices from 2009 to 2012. We 
only consider three goods and, accordingly, three basic wants from which, for the sake of 
feasibility, one is a composite basic want. Heating comprises space and water heating. The 
composite basic want includes cooking and lighting as we are bound by the assumption that the 
number of goods equals the number of basic wants. 
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In consideration of Table 25, we see that for 2009, and even the other years, the first 
entry, 7.7%, represents the ratio of the electricity consumption due to heating to the total 
expenditure allocated to the three commodities. In other words, if multiplied by the total 
expenditure—M—the coefficient gives the electricity consumption due to heating.  More visibly, 
it just represents the fraction of the electricity budget share entering in the heating budget share. 
It is noticeable to see that 45% of gas consumption is due to heating. Over all, heating (space and 
water heating) represents 59 % of all energy consumption. Note that DFO, LPG, and Gas do not 
bring any cooling. Another important remark is the absence of negative numbers inside the 
matrix, unlike the composition matrix obtained from the system of demand estimation. To put it 
more clearly, no commodity consumption will negatively enter a basic want budget share. 
Table 25: US EMPIRICAL T from 2009 to 2012 (we include lighting in heating) 
 Years  2009  2010 
Basic wants  ELEC  DFO/LPG  GAS 
*
T




Heating  0.0772  0.0900  0.4500 0.6172 0.0783 0.0900  0.4500 0.6183
Cooling  0.1337  0.0000  0.0000 0.1337 0.1461 0.0000  0.0000 0.1461
Others  0.2391  0.0100  0.0000 0.2491 0.2256 0.0100  0.0000 0.2356
  *w   0.4500  0.1000  0.4500 1 0.4500 0.1000  0.4500 1
 years  2011  2012 
Basic Wants  ELEC  DFO/LPG  GAS 
*
T




Heating  0.0780  0.0900  0.4500 0.618 0.0793 0.0900  0.4500 0.6193
Cooling  0.1211  0.0000  0.0000 0.1211 0.1189 0.0000  0.0000 0.1189
Others  0.2399  0.0200  0.0010 0.2609 0.2408 0.0200  0.0010 0.2618
  *w   0.4390  0.1100  0.4510 1 0.4390 0.1100  0.4510 1
 
In view of Table 26, the empirical transformation matrix states that 17% and 30% of the 
electricity consumption respectively goes to heating and cooling. These statistics do not vary a 
lot from one year to another. LPG, DFO or gas consumption has 0% contribution in the cooling 
activity. We in fact read 22 23 0r r  . 
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 Table 26: The US empirical transformation matrices  
Years  Empirical R  Empirical S  Row sums 
2009 
0.1716  0.9000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000  1 
0.2971  0.0000 0.0000 3.3657 ‐17.8833 15.5176  1 
0.5313  0.1000 0.0000 0.0000 10.0000 ‐9.0000  1 
Column Sums  1  1 1   
2010 
0.1740  0.9000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000  1 
0.3247  0.0000 0.0000 3.0801 ‐15.4415 13.3614  1 
0.5013  0.1000 0.0000 0.0000 10.0000 ‐9.0000  1 
Column Sums  1  1 1   
2011 
0.1777  0.8182 0.9978 0.0000 ‐0.0123 1.0123  1 
0.2759  0.0000 0.0000 3.6251 ‐10.9976 8.3725  1 
0.5465  0.1818 0.0022 0.0000 5.5556 ‐4.5556  1 
Column Sums  1  1 1            
2012 
0.1806  0.8182 0.9978 0.0000 ‐0.0123 1.0123  1 
0.2708  0.0000 0.0000 3.6922 ‐11.2431 8.5509  1 
0.5485  0.1818 0.0022 0.0000 5.5556 ‐4.5556  1 
Column Sums  1  1 1   
 
4.3. On uncovering the empirical T matrices when only the budgets shares 
(commodities and basic wants) are available 
In most countries, the stock and quality of data available do not allow an ease of 
computation of the empirical composition matrices. In the United Sates the adequate data seem 
to be only available since 2008. In countries endowed with poor data, a survey is necessary to 
assess the basic want budget shares. It is possible that providing all data for estimating *T  is 
costly. In that case finding a way of constructing the composition matrix from the budget shares 
data may be considered as an option.  
In the following development, we raise the possibility of approximating the  composition 
matrix from only the knowledge of commodity and basic wants budget shares. 
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The procedure is to statistically assess the budget shares of the basic wants and the 
commodities. Then using a minimax optimization problem, we compute the empirical 
transformation matrix, which can be plausibly viewed as an approximation of the true 
composition matrix.  
4.3.1. Context setting 
As stated previously, the mathematical definition of the transformation matrix is 
 , , ( )n n n n T R w  (4.1.3) 
Three properties accompany this definition: 
‐ The row sums of the ,n nT  matrix yield the T-good budget shares 
 ,n n TT ι w   (4.1.4) 
‐ The column  sums of the ,n nT  matrix yield the commodity budget shares 
 ,' 'n n ι T w   (4.1.5) 
‐ The components of the ,n nT  sum to one. 
 ,' ' ' 1n n T   ι T ι w w ι   (4.1.6) 
This property is always verified since the sum of the budget shares, whether for the 
commodities or the goods, equals one. 
Note that from (4.1.4) and (4.1.5) we can write 
 , ,' 'n n n n TT ιι T w w   (4.1.7) 
Using the expression of ,n nT  in(4.1.3), (4.1.7) can be written as 
 , ,' 'n n n n TR ιι R w w  (4.1.8) 
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Since ,( ) ;  ' '  and '( ) ',n n   w ι w ι R ι ι w w  we get from (4.1.8) 
 , 'n n TR ww w w   (4.1.9) 
This equation would lead to the determination of the transformation matrix ,n nR  if 'ww  
were invertible. It is not. In fact, we can explicitly write 'ww  as 
 
1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1
2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
1 2
3 3 3
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This expression highlights the singularity issue.  
4.3.2. The optimization problem  
We can circumvent the issue by solving the following program 
 
11 12
, 1( , ,..., )
1
min ' '
subject to :  
1              1,...,




















R ww w w

  (4.1.10) 
Where . 1 ,( )n n ij i j nr  R . 
The first constraint is the expression of the relation: ,' 'n n ι R ι . This condition states 
that the T-goods satisfy the original constraint. We can show that the constraint is equivalent to 
(4.1.5), the second property of the ,n nT  matrix.  
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In fact, premultiplying the mathematical definition— (4.1.3)— of the ,n nT by 'ι  matrix 
we get: 
 ' ' ( )w ι R w   (4.1.11) 
Note that ' '( )w ι w . Replacing the left hand side of (4.1.11) by this expression 
reconstitutes the constraint as follows: 
 ,' 'n n ι R ι   
Hence, the constraint is equivalent to the second property of the ,n nT  matrix.  
4.3.3. Computational procedure 
For simplicity we set: 
-  , 1 ,' ( )n n ij i j nk   K ww   
- , 1 ,' ( )n n T ij i j np   P w w   
- , , 1 ,( )n n n n ij i j nc  R K   
- ,          , 1, ...,ij ij ijb c p i j n     
Under n  commodities, , ,and n n n nK P  are provided by the data. On the contrary, the 
matrix ,n nR  components remain unknown. 
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We can now reformulate the optimization problem (4.1.10) as: 
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The problem is linear and does not need the Kuhn-Tucker approach. 
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The problem becomes at its last stage 
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Where  0 and 0i i    . We can then write 
1
n
im ml il i i
m
r k p a 

   . 
This comes from the fact that x x x    with max( ,0)x x   and max( ,0)x x     
We should observe also that x x x   . 
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  (4.1.13) 
In order to optimally solve the problem, we use the commercial MILP, namely IBM-






Table 27: Empirical T matrices deduced from budget shares 
Years  2009  2010 
ˆ Tw   Basic wants  Elec  Dfo_lpg  Gas    ˆ Tw   Elec  Dfo_lpg  Gas 
HEATING  0.0861  0.1000  0.4500 0.6361 0.0523 0.1000 0.4500  0.6023
COOLING  0.1280  0.0000  0.0000 0.1280 0.1461 0.0000 0.0000  0.1461
OTHERS  0.2359  0.0000  0.0000 0.2359 0.2516 0.0000 0.0000  0.2516
  ŵ   0.4500  0.1000  0.4500 1.0000 0.4500 0.1000 0.4500  1.0000
Years  2011    2012 
ˆ Tw  Basic wants  Elec  Dfo_lpg  Gas  ˆ Tw   Elec  Dfo_lpg  Gas 
HEATING  0.0619  0.1100  0.4510 0.6229 0.0598 0.1100 0.4510  0.6208
COOLING  0.1162  0.0000  0.0000 0.1162 0.1174 0.0000 0.0000  0.1174
OTHERS  0.2609  0.0000  0.0000 0.2609 0.2618 0.0000 0.0000  0.2618
  ŵ   0.4390  0.1100  0.4510 1.0000 0.4390 0.1100 0.4510  1.0000
 
We see that the table pretty well approximates Table 25. Indeed this program will always 
give a solution that verifies all the constraints. However, it has to be signaled that the solution is 
not unique. When we move from three goods to four goods, it becomes necessary to obtain 
additional restrictions. Hopefully, we will often get them. In our case, we have seen in section 
04.2 that 22 23 0r r  . We can use these two constraints to narrow down the solutions. 
In conlusion, by getting the empirical transformation matrices, we can match them with 
the transformation matrices found by the Rotterdam or Aids demand system. This allows us with 
greater certainty to say which T-good corresponds to which basic want. It will be desirable to use 
both the T-good income elasticities and the empirical T matrix to identify which row in our T 
matrix corresponds to which basic want. The simultaneous use of these two tools enables us to 
better understand how the commodity consumptions contribute to the basic want satisfaction. 
Beyond this result, the fact of getting the empirical transformation matrix S  offers the possibility 
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of defining some shadow prices and quantities for the basic want. We recall that the definition of 
these shadow prices is: 
 
1




    
 
1




    
4.4. General approach to a statistical survey for the empirical T matrix elaboration  
So far, this study is based on the conviction that in order to fully apprehend the economic 
determinants of household energy consumption, it is necessary to take the analysis at the level of 
basic wants which are implicit, unlike prices and quantities. Whether we use the Rotterdam 
model, the AIDS, or any other demand system, the results obtained by the Preference 
Independence Transformation would be more effective and credible if we use an empirical 
transformation matrix as a barometer to interpret our findings. In poor countries, and even in 
some rich countries, there is a need to construct data to obtain these tables. In this last section, 
we show that this is easy and possible if the survey directly provides the empirical R  matrix 
entries. The analyses we have conducted so far suggest focusing on the key matrix: the 
transformation matrix *R . Obtaining this matrix before the composition matrix is statistically 
more straightforward.  
For illustration, let us give some imaginary but realistic numbers. Suppose a survey 
establishes that 25%, 55% and 15% of electricity consumed are due to heating, cooling and 
lighting, respectively. The remaining is attributable to negligible basic wants. Similarly, we 
suppose that 75%, 0% and  0% of DFO consumption are due to heating, cooling, and lighting. 
The remaining is imputable to the composite basic want. Concerning gas, we suppose that 60%, 
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0% and 0% are due to heating, cooling, and lighting, respectively. Finally, let us consider that 
90% of LPG consumption is related to heating and nothing for cooling and lighting. Of course 
the 10% is captured by the composite basic want. It is easy to see that having these kind of data 
directly enables us to define the empirical transformation matrix *R . 
 Empirical R 
Commodities 
Basic wants 
Elec. Dfo Gas Lpg 
Heating .25 .75 .60 .90 
Cooling .55 .00 .00 .00 
Lighting .15 .00 .00 .00 
Others .05 .25 .40 .10 
SUMS 1 1 1 1 
 
This table verifies the condition ,' 'n n ι R ι . All it needs is collecting data showing how 
the goods are allocated between basic wants. It directly defines the matrix *R . From this matrix 
we can derive the corresponding * * and T S .  
In conclusion, if a survey has to be conducted on basic wants and commodities, it should 









In this work, we humbly attempted to reopen the chapter of the Preference 
Independence Transformation technique in economic analysis. Since it was introduced by 
Brooks in his dissertation and extensively constructed by Theil, few authors have 
attempted to bring their contributions to it. It is definitely not due to lack of interest in the 
field. Research on basic wants or characteristics as explanatory variables of demand has 
never been so important. Nowadays, expandable possibilities of production make the love 
for varieties more realizable. Technological advances are fluid and continuous.  
Throughout our analysis, our aim was twofold: 
- To find a way to better identify the basic needs after an independent 
transformation.  
- To explore the possibility implement and additional independent transformation 
technique in addition to the PIT technique. 
Our line of attack sought to better unveil the basic wants as key-variables in 
defining US households’ energy consumption. We first explored what has been done so 
far in the field. The Preference Independence Transformation technique was implemented 
only using the Rotterdam model setting. We tried to implement a new technique, related 
to the PIT, with the Almost Ideal Demand System framework. Doing this, there was a 
need to modify it by considering all the elements of the Slutsky matrix. We referred to 
this modified Preference Independence Transformation as the Slutsky Matrix 
Independence Transformation (SMIT). We found the two models did not uncover the 
basic wants in the same way. The results are different. On the one hand, the 
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diagonalization under the Rotterdam model is done on the specific effect, the 
diagonalization of which implies the diagonalization of the Hessian matrix U . On the 
other hand, the AIDS diagonalization is performed on a wider portion of the expenditure 
function Hessian matrix. The results will be even more different the further the candidate-
matrices of the two systems to be diagonalized are from one another.  
This observation raises the need to look for an additional way of uncovering the 
basic wants with more confidence. We asked the question whether the results provided by 
the transformation were reversible. More clearly, if given an empirical transformation 
matrix—a concept that we have introduced in the analysis, is it possible to get back the 
empirical transformation matrices? The answer is yes. We can use the following two 
relations: 
 * * 1( )R T w   
 * *' 1( )S R  
The knowledge of *R will help us see the real restrictions on the ijr . That is, it will inform 
us of which good is not contributing to which basic want and of which good is the highest 
provider of a given basic want. When facing results provided by two systems of demand, the 
transformation matrix *R is a good criterion to check which one performs better in association 
with the PIT or the SMIT. 
The knowledge of *S  enables us to compute some shadow price and volume log-changes 
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We asked a yet more specific question: If only the commodity and basic want budget 
shares are available, is it possible to uncover the empirical T matrix, and get back to the first 
question? The answer is less conclusive. If the number of goods is very limited, the answer is 
yes. In that case, we need to use a 1 norml   minimax optimization. With more than three goods, 
the solution exists, but it is necessary to add more restrictions. 
It appears that the more realistic outcome is obtained when we conduct a survey on the 
empirical transformation matrix *R . Indeed, the transformation matrix *R  concentrates key 
information for the PIT. 
In conclusion, having *R or *T is interesting insofar as they allow us to have more 
realistic basic want expenditure elasticities. It suffices to consider the two following relations: 
 * * * 1, , ,( )T n n n n n n

 μ R M S   
 * * 1 *( ) ( )T T T

 Λ w μ   
These formulas provide basic want expenditure elasticities that are more accurate, since 
they combine the parameters estimated from one of the models and the empirical budget shares.  
A last contribution of this work is showing that an approximation of the income by the 
total expenditure on a microeconomic scale may overvalue the income elasiticities of the 
commodities and the basic wants as well. In fact, all system-wide approaches of demand lie on 
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the adding-up property that total expenditure equals income. There is need to multiply these 
values by the elasticity of the total expenditure with respect to income to fully give these found 
elasticities their real scope.  
While the preference independence transformation can be applied directly to the relative 
price version of the Rotterdam model, direct application to the AIDs model would be extremely 
difficult.  The absolute price version of the Rotterdam model contains marginal budget shares 
and Slutsky coefficients as parameters.  Those coefficients, if derived for the AIDS model, 
would be nonlinear functions.  In principle those functions could be substituted into the absolute 
price version of the Rotterdam model, and then the absolute price version of the Rotterdam 
model, with AIDS coefficients, could be transformed into the analog of the relative price 
version.  The resulting price coefficient matrix could be diagonalized to produce the preference 
independent transformation.  But the elements of the resulting price coefficient matrix would be 
extremely complicated nonlinear functions, producing an unreasonably difficult preference 
independence transformation. 
Since the preference independence transformation would thereby be unrealistically 
difficult to apply to the AIDS model, I have defined a transformation more suitable to the 
parameterization and form of the AIDS model.  The result is transformed goods characterized by 
Slutsky independence among them, in the sense that Hicks-Slutsky interactions are 
removed.  While this transformation is practical with the AIDS model, it should be emphasized 
that the interpretation of the resulting T-goods is more complicated than the interpretation of the 
basic wants produced by the preference independence transformation with the Rotterdam model.  
The original preference independence transformation is a direct transformation of the 
utility function into a new utility function containing basic wants as arguments.  That utility 
137 
 
function has the normal properties of a utility function with nonseparable interactions removed, 
thereby rationalizing the interpretation of transformed goods as “basic wants.”  In contrast, my 
transformation of AIDS produces derived demands for transformed goods having Hicks-Slutsky 
interactions removed.  Caution should be used in imputing conventional properties to demand for 
those transformed goods without a derived utility function containing them.  Further research 
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Appendix A Absolute version estimation without symmetry, and with constant 
 
Equation  Observation  Parameter  RMSE  2R    2χ    p‐value 
Equation 1  184  4  .0466053 0.8172 822.35  0.0000
Equation 2  184  4  .0061578 0.6037 280.30  0.0000
Equation 3  184  4  .040203 0.8609 1138.56  0.0000
Equation 4  184  4  .0053249 0.7801 652.73  0.0000
 
  Coefficients  Std. error t‐student p‐value Confidence intervals 
Equation 1       
DQt  .4500254  .0207568 21.68 0.000 .4093427  .490708
ELE  ‐.8907213  .0523408 ‐17.02 0.000 ‐.9933074  ‐.7881351
DFO  ‐.2112631  .059649 ‐3.54 0.000 ‐.328173  ‐.0943531
LPG  .2329829  .0573705 4.06 0.000 .1205388  .345427
C  .0010363  .0034405 0.30 0.763 ‐.0057069  .0077795
Equation 2       
DQt  .0409534  .0027425 14.93 0.000 .0355781  .0463287
ELE  .0307495  .0069156 4.45 0.000 .0171951  .0443038
DFO  .0011675  .0078812 0.15 0.882 ‐.0142795  .0166144
LPG  ‐.013639  .0075802 ‐1.80 0.072 ‐.0284959  .0012178
C  ‐.0001779  .0004546 ‐0.39 0.696 ‐.0010689  .0007131
Equation 3       
DQt  .4718923  .0179054 26.35 0.000 .4367983  .5069862
ELE  .7520093  .0451506 16.66 0.000 .6635156  .8405029
DFO  .1925055  .0514549 3.74 0.000 .0916557  .2933552
LPG  ‐.200264  .0494894 ‐4.05 0.000 ‐.2972614  ‐.1032666
C  ‐.0007207  .0029678 ‐0.24 0.808 ‐.0065376  .0050962
Equation 4       
DQt  .037129  .0023716 15.66 0.000 .0324807  .0417772
ELE  .1079626  .0059803 18.05 0.000 .0962414  .1196837
DFO  .0175901  .0068153 2.58 0.010 .0042324  .0309478
LPG  ‐.0190798  .0065549 ‐2.91 0.004 ‐.0319273  ‐.0062324
C  ‐.0001377  .0003931 ‐0.35 0.726 ‐.0009082  .0006327
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Appendix B Absolute version without  symmetry without constant 
Equations  Observation  Parameter  RMSE  2R    2χ    p‐value 
Equation 1  184  4  .0466168 0.8174 823.49  0.0000
Equation 2  184  4  .0061604 0.6036 280.19  0.0000
Equation 3  184  4  .0402095 0.8609 1138.82  0.0000
Equation 4  184  4  .0053267 0.7803 653.39  0.0000
 
  Coefficients  Std. error t‐student p‐value Confidence intervals 
Equation 1       
DQt  .4500314  .020762  21.68 0.000 .4093387  .4907241
ELE  ‐.8914686  .0522949 ‐17.05 0.000 ‐.9939647  ‐.7889725
DFO  ‐.2109469  .0596545 ‐3.54 0.000 ‐.3278676  ‐.0940263
GAS  .2327506  .0573794 4.06 0.000 .120289  .3452123
Equation 2       
DQt  .0409524  .0027437 14.93 0.000 .0355749  .0463299
ELE  .0308777  .0069107 4.47 0.000 .017333  .0444225
DFO  .0011132  .0078833 0.14 0.888 ‐.0143378  .0165642
GAS  ‐.0135992  .0075826 ‐1.79 0.073 ‐.0284609  .0012626
Equation 3       
DQt  .471888  .0179083 26.35 0.000 .4367884  .5069876
ELE  .752529  .0451071 16.68 0.000 .6641206  .8409373
DFO  .1922856  .0514552 3.74 0.000 .0914353  .2931359
GAS  ‐.2001025  .0494928 ‐4.04 0.000 ‐.2971066  ‐.1030983
Equation 4       
DQt  .0371282  .0023724 15.65 0.000 .0324784  .041778
ELE  .1080619  .0059755 18.08 0.000 .09635 .1197737
DFO  .0175481  .0068165 2.57 0.010 .0041881  .0309082





Appendix C Absolute version estimation, symmetry and homogeneity imposed 
Equation  Observation  Parameter  RMSE  2R    2χ    p‐value 
Equation 1  184  4  .0487502 0.8003 811.51  0.0000
Equation 2  184  4  .0062405 0.5932 129.26  0.0000
Equation 4  184  4  .0055228 0.7638 591.28  0.0000
 
  Coefficients Std. error t‐student p‐value Confidence intervals 
Equation 1       
DQt  .4271871  .0201586 21.19 0.000 .3876769 .4666973
ELE  ‐.857377  .0485713 ‐17.65 0.000 ‐.9525751 ‐.7621789
DFO  .0214555  .0093793 2.29 0.022 .0030724 .0398387
LPG  .1049314  .005809  18.06 0.000 .0935459 .1163168
Equation 2       
DQt  .0421955  .0039182 10.77 0.000 .034516 .0498749
ELE  .0214555  .0093793 2.29 0.022 .0030724 .0398387
DFO  ‐.0120974  .0079147 ‐1.53 0.126 ‐.0276099 .0034151
LPG  ‐.0062495  .0036314 ‐1.72 0.085 ‐.0133669 .0008678
Equation 4       
DQt  .0394701  .0023984 16.46 0.000 .0347693 .0441708
ELE  .1049314  .005809  18.06 0.000 .0935459 .1163168
DFO  ‐.0062495  .0036314 ‐1.72 0.085 ‐.0133669 .0008678







Appendix D     Asymptotic variance-covariance provided by Stata 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
